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Abstract  
As a former journalist and current journalism lecturer, I regularly encounter one 
overriding theme relating to my former profession - the political bias of UK 
newspapers. Since 1979, British newspapers as a whole have been 
overwhelmingly anti-Labour apart from the golden era of Tony Blair's three 
general election triumphs.  It was my aim to look at how Labour transformed its 
position with the press from a low point in 1983, when it was backed by only 
one of the main daily papers, to 1997 when it was supported by four, including 
the biggest seller, The Sun.  
To make sense of the many issues involved a framework was used consisting 
of four key factors necessary for a successful media strategy. This framework 
was applied to the general elections of 1983, 1987, 1992 and 1997. The 
changes were analysed alongside the debate that surrounded these changes.  
The existing narrative argues that the media strategy was transformed during 
this period. Press operations were re-organised, professionalised and new 
tactics were introduced. These changes played a major part in the electoral 
success of 1997.  
Underpinning this transformation was a belief that media support was vital to 
success. Modernisers say policy was changed to meet the demands of the 
electorate and was consistent with New Labour ideology. The fact that it found 
support in the media was down to good strategy. Traditionalists argue policy 
was changed to meet the demands of the media. 
Undoubtedly, there were many positive aspects to developments in the media 
strategy. However, some senior New Labour figures now accept that serious 
mistakes were made. They have also added weight to the view that the media 
was allowed too much direct influence on the formulation of Labour Party policy. 
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Introduction  
In the summer of 1996 I was a TV producer for the BBC's Breakfast News 
programme, based opposite the House of Commons at Millbank. Late one 
afternoon I was due to interview somebody from the Labour Party. The 
interview would be recorded and last only a few minutes. It would then be 
passed to one of the political reporters to use in their TV package. As part of the 
piece, the reporter would choose one of the answers - preferably lasting around 
15-20 seconds. A soundbite. I had done many of these types of interviews 
before and the format was straightforward. Get the interviewee talking, have a 
couple of key questions, listen out for anything particularly newsworthy and get 
a succinct answer of reasonable length. Crucially, give the reporter some 
choice. Make sure there were a couple of alternative answers for them to 
choose from. This would provide an element of journalistic freedom to do the 
story we thought was important to our viewers. 
Peter Mandelson arrived and I tried to engage him in conversation as we 
checked the sound levels. He remained stony faced. The interview began with a 
general question and he delivered a perfect sound bite. About 20 seconds long 
without the slightest pause, making it difficult to cut down in the edit. I asked 
another question and got exactly the same answer. A third question - a few 
words were moved around but it was essentially the same answer. The process 
was repeated for questions four and five. I complained. Mandelson gave me a 
stare as if to say: "Take it or leave it." I took it. Should I have highlighted the fact 
he had simply offered up one answer? Too self-indulgent, I thought. The 
viewers weren't interested in the minutiae of political journalism. So there it was: 
the answer Mandelson wanted to give, the line he wanted to spin. New Labour's 
communications strategy in operation: well organised, setting the agenda, 
getting across a simple pre-arranged message in a format suitable for the pre-
eminent media of the age - TV. Less than a year later, Labour would go on to 
win a crushing general election victory and return to power after 18 years in 
opposition. 
Contrast that situation with 1983 and the most inept general election media 
campaign in Labour's post war history. Tabloid newspapers sold over ten million 
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copies a day and retained a huge influence on setting the political agenda. They 
were scathing of Michael Foot's leadership of the Labour Party. The Sun - 
selling nearly four million copies a day - was vicious. This profile was typical: 
"On TV, we see the vision of an amiable old buffer, his jacket buttoned too tight, 
his grey hair falling lankly."1 This was just one manifestation of a shambolic 
general election campaign and a dire media strategy. 
Of course, efficient media strategies do not lead directly to election success but 
they help. 1983 to 1997 saw much more than a change in Labour's dealings 
with the media - it was a transformation. How and why this happened is the 
focus of this dissertation. There were major changes in Labour's relationships 
with the media, which were almost non-existent for some of this period and 
extremely close in the latter part. This relationship included dramatic changes in 
a number of areas: what tactics the party used to get its message across; what 
that message was and who was delivering it.  
The next chapter outlines the approach and the methodology to be used. To 
give structure to the various disparate elements I will use a framework which 
includes four key factors that need to be understood to implement a successful 
media strategy. They are: the message; the messenger; the media context and 
the methods. This framework will be used throughout the dissertation to 
highlight why a certain strategy failed or succeeded. Next is the literature review 
giving a broad outline of the work already undertaken on this subject, followed 
by an outline of the primary sources used.  The chapters which follow are 
broken down into a narrative analysis of the general elections of 1983, 1987, 
1992 and 1997. The conclusion summarises the findings and addresses the 
themes which emerged from the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 David Butler / Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1983 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1984), p. 207. 
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Approach and Methodology 
This dissertation will examine how the Labour Party dealt with the media 
between 1983 and 1997. It is not an examination of how the media dealt with 
Labour, although that is relevant insofar as it allows us to assess the impact of 
Labour's media strategies. The subject of the anti-Labour bias in the press has 
been analysed extensively by others and it will be referred to throughout. The 
focus here is on how and why the party changed its media strategy and with 
what consequences. For my purposes, the media is UK national newspapers 
and the two main TV channels, BBC1 and ITV. The impact of 24 hour news 
remained limited in this period and will be referred to only briefly. 
Judging the success of a media strategy is difficult. Electoral success is one 
indicator. But the three elections being discussed in detail here throw up some 
interesting issues. 1992 is often seen as a good campaign for Labour, despite 
defeat at the hands of John Major. Tony Blair's campaign in 1997 is almost 
universally lauded as a brilliant campaign and yet is deemed by some 
commentators to have been the start of a breakdown in media relations, with 
detrimental long term consequences for the party.2 A more useful definition of 
success would be the positive and widespread coverage of issues the party 
sought to highlight. There are many variables associated with this, however, not 
least the definitions of "positive and widespread" and whether the issues the 
party chose to highlight were the issues that would gain them electoral 
advantage.  
A balance needs to be struck between present-mindedness and historicism. 
Present-mindedness has been useful because the outcome of the 2017 general 
election has helped in defining what a successful media campaign actually is. 
Success certainly needs to be judged from where the party starts a campaign. It 
also highlights the importance of what type of media is being used. Writing this 
18 months ago would have been a different experience to today. Following 
Jeremy Corbyn's election as Labour leader, many commentators predicted a 
merciless press attack once the general election campaign began.  
                                            
2
 Nicholas Jones, Sultans of Spin (London: Orion Books, 2000), p.13. 
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Nick Cohen of The Observer was one of many writers on this theme: "The 
Tories have gone easy on Corbyn and his comrades…in an election they would 
tear them to pieces."3 Others found comparisons to Michael Foot too difficult to 
resist.4 The widespread assumption was that vilification in the media would be 
followed by annihilation at the polls. This would have played into the narrative of 
Labour modernisers who view the heyday of "New" Labour as a golden age for 
its media strategy. But Corbyn's press campaign was not the disaster that was 
predicted. This was partly down to the new media context, with the influence of 
newspapers continuing to decline and the increasing significance and effective 
use by Labour of social media. TV was also well used, with Corbyn attracting 
huge crowds around the country giving broadcasters strong pictures and the 
basis of a good story. In addition, perhaps with the assumption that the result 
was a foregone conclusion, the traditional Tory press felt able to criticise 
Theresa May's sometimes lacklustre campaign.  
Analysis should not be rooted in the past. As Black and MacRaild put it: "..we 
must strike a balance between judging the past by our own standards and 
entirely standing the past in its own frozen compartment of history."5 They go on 
to explain that a historicist approach risks downplaying continuities; the present 
minded stance can overplay continuities. We might see this in the roles of 
individuals such as Peter Mandelson and Alistair Campbell. Historically, 
Mandelson may be seen as the architect of a new way of dealing with the media 
for Labour, certainly judging by the acres of news coverage he generated. But 
looking from a modern perspective one can see certain similarities with previous 
press secretaries such as Joe Haines. Conversely, Alistair Campbell's role is 
often compared with that of Sir Bernard Ingham, Margaret Thatcher's press 
secretary. But viewed historically, there are clear differences. Ingham's was an 
aggressive but essentially traditional role. Campbell was far closer to his boss 
with unprecedented access and influence. Andrew Marr describes him as Blair's 
                                            
3
 Nick Cohen, The Observer, March 19
th
 2017. Accessed at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/19/jeremy-corbyn-labour-threat-party-
election-support 
4
 Polly Toynbee, The Guardian, April 19
th
 2017. Accessed at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/19/general-election-labour-annihilation-
jeremy-corbyn 
5
 Jeremy Black / Donald MacRaild Studying History (London: Palgrave, 2017), p.15. 
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right hand man."6 Undoubtedly, this was linked to the increasing importance that 
was attached to the media by the New Labour leadership.  
The analysis will draw on a vast array of secondary literature and primary 
sources. This material covers not just the main issue itself - how the Labour 
Party dealt with the media - but also related subjects such as the Labour Party, 
its organisation and ideology. There is also a wide range of historical material 
related to general election campaigns, political communications, and the 
psychology of communications. Whilst this material is plentiful it has rarely been 
brought together to look closely at how the Labour Party dealt with the media. In 
addition, information from three primary sources will inform the analysis. TV 
news bulletins, newspaper archives and statements submitted to the Leveson 
Inquiry and published in 2012. A detailed literature review follows in the next 
chapter.  
A framework containing four key factors will be used to help determine the 
success of a media campaign. These factors cannot be viewed in isolation but 
are connected to - and will influence - each other. The first is the message. 
What message does the party want to get across? Success in promoting the 
message is perhaps the single most important outcome of a media strategy. 
The message can be defined as a specific policy or a general policy, with the 
focus on how the party did this during the general election campaigns of this 
period. There is a limit with this approach as the idea of the "permanent 
campaign"7 began to emerge during this period. This idea says success at the 
polls is achieved over a much longer period of time rather than just the month or 
so of a general election campaign. Nevertheless, the campaign period remains 
relevant because the parties place huge emphasis on it and the point is to keep 
the message consistent, no matter what the period of time. Usually, most 
political messages being transmitted through the media need to be clear, simple 
and coherent. Many factors affect what the message might be but it is 
essentially the result of party political discussion and the production of policy  
                                            
6
 Andrew Marr, How Blair Put the Media in a Spin BBC News Online (May 10
th
 2007). Accessed 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6638231.stm 
7
 Jay Blumler / Dennis Kavanagh, The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and 
Features, in Political Communication, volume 16 issue 3 (1999), pp. 209-230. 
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and - at the times of a general election - a manifesto.  
The crucial issue for strategists is to judge how the media will respond to those 
messages. If the response is likely to be positive, success in the campaign 
overall is more likely. If the response is likely to be negative, does the message 
itself need changing or can other factors be altered? Even a clear and 
consistent message communicated through a sympathetic media is no 
guarantee of electoral success. This could be because of a whole range of 
factors but one may be that the electorate just do not like the message. What is 
clear is that over this period the message changed dramatically. The left wing 
manifesto of Foot's party was changed and moved to the right in both 1987 and 
1992. Further dramatic changes took place for the 1997 manifesto. 
The second factor is the messenger - who is trying to get the message across? 
How did they try to convey the message and how successful were they? It will 
be vital to examine the importance of a leader's talents in trying to sell a political 
message and their willingness to deal with the media. The theme across the 
period is a general improvement, admittedly from a low point with Michael Foot. 
He was seen as both unwilling and unable to engage with the new TV age and 
led a party still suspicious of the media and reluctant to engage with it. 
Furthermore, when he did engage there were disastrous consequences due to 
his appearance and his poor understanding of the demands of television. Neil 
Kinnock showed greater willingness to understand and engage with 
broadcasters and presided over more successful campaigns in 1987 and 1992. 
But he remained suspicious of the press, especially the tabloid press, and 
suffered greatly at their hands. Tony Blair is often regarded as a brilliant political 
communicator. He recognised the importance of the media and developed twin 
strategies to deal with both broadcasters and the press. He was televisual and 
understood how to deliver a political message in a clear, concise soundbite. He 
was personally persuasive and appealed to Fleet Street newspaper editors. 
There is little doubt that in the 1997 campaign he was a highly effective 
messenger. 
The third factor is about understanding the media context of the time, the 
significance of different parts of the media and their style and political outlook. 
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There is little doubt that Labour faced serious hostility from the press in the 
general elections of 1983, 1987 and 1992. In 1983 only the Daily Mirror and 
Sunday Mirror backed Labour and there was remarkably little change before 
1997. The Guardian switched from the Alliance in 1983 to Labour in 1987 and 
1992, when the Financial Times also backed the Party. The overwhelming 
majority of newspaper readership supported the Conservatives and certainly for 
the 1983, 1987 and 1992 general elections that support was strident and 
viciously anti-Labour. The big switch came with the 1997 campaign and the 
changing allegiance of The Sun and the News of the World, two newspapers 
with huge readerships. Context also refers to the tone of the coverage and that 
changed significantly in 1997, even amongst the most strident of Tory 
newspapers, the Daily Mail. 
The anti-Labour tone in the 1980s was a reflection of the political culture of the 
time. Free market economics were in the ascendancy, particularly in Britain and 
in America following the election of President Reagan. In Britain, Margaret 
Thatcher provided the tough, high profile figure the tabloids loved - a figure who 
in 1982 had led Britain to success in a war that proved popular with the British 
public. Kelvin Mackenzie at The Sun and Sir David English at the Daily Mail 
were two combative newspaper editors who appeared to reflect the early 1980s 
stereotype of a union bashing, free market, "loadsamoney" culture.  
The issue of the importance of newspapers and television will be a recurring 
theme throughout this period. Undoubtedly, the relative influence of newspapers 
declined over this period. During the 1980s it became something of a cliché to 
say that each election had become a "television election" but there is little doubt 
that television gradually grew in importance. To what extent Labour recognised 
this change and how successfully they dealt with it is one of the issues 
addressed below. Did they also recognise that, despite declining sales, 
newspapers often retained a disproportionate influence in setting the political 
agenda that many broadcasters would follow?  
The fourth pillar of my framework looks at the methods used to try and get 
Labour's message across in the media. The Labour Party which won the 
general election of 1997 was, in organisational and operational terms, radically 
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different to the party which lost in 1983. Certainly, it had transformed in terms of 
policy but also in the methods it used in its political campaigning. The 1983 
election was a disaster for Labour but also a low point in its media strategy. For 
many commentators there are few words that could adequately describe the 
abject nature of the campaign. From Foot's reluctance and inability to engage 
with the media to the in-fighting and lack of strategy, future party officials would 
hold it up as a template for how not to deal with the media. In stark contrast, the 
Conservative campaign appeared to be smooth, efficient and effective.  
After 1983, there followed a period of radical change in methods. There was a 
general acceptance that many of the new campaigning methods were not just 
successful but were crucial in taking the party into power in 1997. By 1985, all 
campaigning and communications had been brought together as one entity but 
it was the arrival of Peter Mandelson that instilled discipline and focus. Greater 
use was made of outside experts and focus groups and opinion polls became 
central to the party's campaigning. Other new concepts were introduced, aimed 
at influencing what the media reported. Firstly, this took the form of developing 
the idea of "agenda setting". This involved staging political events that provided 
good pictures for TV, making them more likely to appear on TV bulletins. 
Secondly, to deal with stories that were already in the media and were 
detrimental to the party, came the notion of rapid rebuttal. Party officials would 
challenge journalists' stories and attempt to get stories changed so they were 
more favourable. This has generated a huge amount of debate, with journalists 
claiming they were bullied and, on some occasions, lied to. These tactics 
improved Labour's media strategy beyond doubt but were pursued with 
increasing aggression, especially after Blair's general election victory.  
In summary, my approach will involve a thorough analysis of the literature 
available on this subject. Additionally, I will examine key primary sources 
including relevant statements from the Leveson Inquiry of 2012 and national 
newspaper archives. I will also look at some material from the BBC TV and 
radio archives. This information will be brought together to analyse Labour's 
media strategies at the 1987, 1992 and 1997 general elections using the 
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framework I have described with its four key factors:  the message, the 
messengers, the media context and the methods.   
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Literature Review    
The literature relevant to this topic covers a variety of subject areas. It includes 
histories of the Party itself, the media, political communication, and psychology. 
Much of this material focuses on how the media treated the Labour Party, rather 
than my concern with how Labour tried to deal with the media. Nevertheless, 
this material provides a good secondary source grounding and highlights 
relevant themes. Some of the best material on the crucial developments 
following Tony Blair's election as party leader was produced quickly and 
informed the debate at the time. In this sense, it can be viewed as primary 
source material. Other primary sources include newspaper and TV archives and 
books from those directly involved. In addition, a number of the key individuals 
submitted statements relevant to this topic to the Leveson Inquiry in 2012.  
Laura Beers highlights some of the successes of the party's media campaigns 
in the interwar period. She suggests the period overall should be judged as a 
success for Labour's media relations. "The party's ability to compete 
successfully in the new arena of mass media politics played a crucial role in its 
political recovery after 1931 and its landslide victory fourteen years later."8 
Themes which arose in the 1980s are identified by Beers as existing in the 
1920s such as the lessons to be learned from the Conservative Party's 
successful dealings with the media and the reluctance of the left to engage with 
new methods of political communication.  A complicated picture emerges but 
there is plenty of evidence to show that the Labour Party was aware of the 
media climate and engaged with it to promote its political ends through a 
sophisticated media strategy. 
Franklin argues Labour continued to engage with the media in the post war 
period, especially with the emergence of television. Tony Benn's 1953 report: 
"The Labour Party and Broadcasting" highlights the potential advantages for the 
party and Franklyn credits the party with inventing the daily party press 
conference in 1959.9 Ironically, the party came close to abandoning it  
                                            
8
 Laura Beers, Your Britain: The Media and the Making of the Labour Party (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 202.   
9
 Bob Franklin, Packaging Politics (London: Hodder Headline PLC, 1994), p.132. 
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less than 30 years later out of frustration with the partisan nature of the press. 
There was a certain ideological consistency with Labour targeting the 
broadcasters who were deemed to be less biased than the press given the 
stricter broadcasting rules, especially at general elections. However, this 
relationship came under greater scrutiny as the left gained more influence in the 
1960s and 70s. This time the ideological argument was that compliance with 
broadcasters led to an Americanisation of political campaigning, with an 
emphasis on personalities and not policies.10 
The political and economic context of the relationship between the press and 
the Labour Party is discussed by James Thomas.11 He describes a clash 
between a pro-capitalist press and a socialist political party, a clash he says is 
one of the chief features of politics in the 20th century. Of course, capitalist 
publications sometimes supported Labour, although they were capitalist in the 
broadest sense of operating in a free market to make a profit. Equally, Labour 
could be described as socialist only in the very broadest of terms. The Daily 
Mirror and Sunday Mirror have been consistent supporters of Labour in this 
period. The Guardian, The Observer, The Independent, Financial Times and 
most famously The Sun have all supported Labour at various points. 
Nevertheless, the general elections of 1983, 1987 and 1992 saw vehement and 
overwhelming opposition from the press and it was not until 1997 that the 
majority of newspaper readership backed the Party. Thomas points out in the 
post war period some newspapers often shifted with the changing political 
climate. The Daily Mail's editor in 1963 was the Labour supporting Mike 
Randall. Whilst this did not necessarily translate into support for Labour it often 
led to a less partisan approach. At the 1964 general election with the Daily 
Express circulation at its peak of 4.2 million, it dismayed many Conservative 
politicians with its "lively but impartial coverage."12 The gulf widened again from 
1979, as Labour moved to the left and the popular press rallied behind the right 
wing Conservative Party, a position that was to remain until 1997. Following  
                                            
10
 Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 54. 
11
 James Thomas, Popular Newspapers, The Labour Party and British Politics (Oxfordshire: 
Routledge, 2015). 
12
 Ibid. p. 49. 
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Margaret Thatcher's departure and the struggles of the Major government, the 
popular press became less aligned to the Tories and demonstrated another 
change of direction. Labour's new youthful telegenic leader had moved his party 
to the centre ground, so much so the ideological clash between Labour and the 
press barely registered. Indeed, just as in the 1960s, the editor of the Daily Mail 
fell short of supporting Labour but did alter the tone of his paper's coverage with 
many positive comments about the Labour leader. 
General election histories have been invaluable to this work. Butler and 
Kavanagh offer some useful insights into the 1983 and the 1992 campaigns 
with chapters on the press and broadcasting.13 The issue of the importance of 
television is discussed here with Martin Harrison commenting: "In a sense, 
every election is now a 'television election' but never in quite the same way."14 
However, 1983 did mark the introduction of four TV channels rather than three 
and news coverage was widespread and focussed on the leaders, a "staging 
post" to an uncertain future about TV and political communication, as Harrison 
puts it. 15 
There are also many newspaper and magazine articles about specific Labour 
Party general election campaigns in publications such as the New Statesman 
and volumes of Parliamentary Affairs. Authors including Sebastian Berry 
challenge the narrative of the modernisers who argued the Labour campaigns 
of 1987 and 1992 were well run and election defeat was down to poor policy. 
Writing about the 1992 campaign in particular, Berry questions whether it was 
the success that many Labour politicians and commentators deemed it to be. 
He points to errors such as the row over the "Jennifer's Ear" party political 
broadcast and suggests the Sheffield rally was an own goal. He also highlights 
Labour's failure to set the agenda during the final week of the campaign.16 
                                            
13
 Butler / Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1983. 
David Butler / Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd,1992). 
14
 Butler / Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1983, p.147. 
15
 Ibid. p. 174. 
16
 Sebastian Berry, Party Strategy and the Media: The Failure of Labour's 1992 Election 
Campaign, in Parliamentary Affairs, volume 45 issue 4 (1992), pp. 565-581. 
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Eric Shaw's two Labour Party histories have been important to this work.17 He 
offers some fascinating detail about the changes to the party during the 1980s 
and early 90s. He accepts some of the critical analysis that followed the general 
election campaigns of 1987 and 1992 but questions the radical policy 
developments that followed those defeats. He argues the new strategy of 
moving the party to the centre ground was based on incorrect interpretation of 
polling and focus group data used by the Party. He also questions the reliance 
on television as the main means of communication. Shaw's argument is that TV 
news, although on the surface fairer to Labour, was of limited value to the Party. 
The big issues, such as the economy, could not be discussed to Labour's 
advantage within the context of short TV soundbites. Shaw also claims TV's 
commitment to balance and fairness rested on the use of experts deemed to be 
independent but who were often from the middle class establishment and 
conservative in outlook. Published before Tony Blair became Prime Minister, 
this work could be viewed as valuable primary source material.  
Shaw and others such as David McKie also say changing policy to suit the 
tabloids was just not necessary, certainly by 1997. "In the light of the 1997 
result," said McKie, "one has to suspect that New Labour could have got away 
with a much more resolute and challenging attitude to the Murdoch press."18 
McKie focuses in particular on The Sun. Whilst he understood the almost 
desperate attempts by Labour to woo Murdoch, he emphasises just how much 
Murdoch was ready to reciprocate. The paper was thoroughly disillusioned with 
the Major government and high interest rates were hurting News Corporation 
finances. In addition, Labour had a huge lead in the polls well before the 
election campaign began and when The Sun declared for Blair.  These views 
pre-suppose there was a fundamental change in the nature of the Party but 
others challenge this assertion. Steven Fielding argues the Blair Labour Party 
was less distinctive than many assume and much of the rhetoric has been taken 
at face value.19 New Labour, he suggests, was not particularly new and the 
                                            
17
 Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979. 
    Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher Ltd, 1996). 
18
 David McKie, in Crewe,I. / Gosschalk, B. / Bartle, J., (eds.),Why Labour Won the General 
Election of 1997 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), pp. 115-130. 
19
 Steven Fielding, The Labour Party Continuity and Change in the Making of "New" Labour, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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roots of some of its key features go back beyond 1994 or even 1979.  Harris 
also highlights the continuities and the links between New Labour and Anthony 
Crosland's Future of Socialism, even suggesting Ramsay MacDonald would find 
New Labour a congenial spiritual home.20 There is some evidence to support 
these arguments - the continuing commitment to equality, for example, but 
these debates do not relate directly to this thesis. I am concerned with changes 
to the media strategy in particular rather than to policy and the party in general. 
Questions about how radically the media strategy changed are relevant. Also, 
the period in question goes beyond that of Tony Blair and clearly some of the 
changes in media strategy were evident in the early years of Neil Kinnock's 
leadership. 
Another major area of literature is political communication. Ralph Negrine 
argues since the Second World War political communication has been 
transformed.21 He gives two key examples to support his case: the 
professionalisation of communications and the use of television as a means of 
communication. Negrine says in some ways the changes seen in my period of 
study could be viewed as the natural response to election defeat and the use of 
the latest technology. But he argues the changes went beyond that and became 
a transformation. He justifies the use of the word because "the skills that are 
currently in use are different - qualitatively - from what they were in the past."22 
Many of these skills were introduced in the period between 1985 and 1995 so 
are directly relevant to this study. In addition, the growth in importance of TV 
and its tendency to personalise campaigning meant the issue of leadership (the 
messengers) was increasingly important. Negrine says politics is "conditioned" 
by the major media of the day.23 
The role of television is highlighted in detail by Blumler and Kavanagh.24 They 
identify three ages of political communication. Age 1 runs to the mid-1960s and 
                                            
20
 Jose Harris, Labour's Political and Social Thought, in Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane, Nick 
Tiratsoo (eds.), Labour's First Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 
21
  Ralph Negrine, Transformation in Political Communication, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), p.1.   
22
 Negrine, Transformation in Political Communication, p.195. 
23
 Ibid. p. 43. 
24
 Blumler / Kavanagh, in Political Communication, volume 16 issue 3, pp. 209-230. 
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is characterised as the "golden age of parties."25 Political parties reflected the 
cleavages in society and many voters related to politics through long standing 
party allegiances. Political communication was subordinate to these strong and 
stable political identifications and beliefs. That did not mean, of course, that 
slight changes in allegiance and the vagaries of the first past the post system 
could not have dramatic effects on a general election result. As Robert Pearce 
states, the 1951 general election victory for the Conservatives by 26 seats was 
the "only election in modern British history where the runner up in terms of votes 
gained an actual majority of seats in the House of Commons." 26 
Age 2 goes from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, an age where strong party 
loyalties were being loosened. But it also affected media relations as television 
became the dominant medium of political communication. Television reached 
more people and regulation of broadcasters created a more balanced approach 
to politics than newspapers. TV news formats demanded a simplification of the 
political message and its visual nature tended to personalise politics. This partly 
influenced my decision to make one of the factors in my framework the 
messenger/s. 
The "third phase" was still emerging at the time of the authors' writing. However, 
it did highlight a number of possible changes which I have brought together 
under the "methods" section of the framework. Broadly speaking, Blumler and 
Kavanagh highlight the growing importance of television as it began to emerge 
as a multi-platform medium with a growing number of channels. This, they say, 
increased the reliance on marketing and communications experts as parties 
embarked on what has been termed "permanent campaigning". By this point, 
Blumler and Kavanagh argue that at the early stages of their decision making 
politicians now had to ask themselves: "How will it play in the media?" 27  
Primary source material comes from some of the key players in the 
development of Labour's media strategy. They include MPs, spin doctors, 
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pollsters and marketing executives. The key primary work is from one of the 
architects of the whole New Labour project, Philip Gould.28 He offers a detailed 
and strategic analysis of Labour's relationship with the media. He was clear that 
nothing short of a revolution in organisation, strategy and policy would save the 
party after 1983. For him, the only problem for Labour in the 1980s and early 
1990s was that it did not move quickly enough in all of these areas. He claims 
the 1987 campaign was lost because: "We had not changed far enough, fast 
enough. The engine had been polished but it was still a Victorian relic." 29 Tony 
Blair describes the organisation and implementation of the '87 campaign as 
stunning but the message was wrong.30 Of course Gould was involved in the 
campaign so it should not be a surprise that he would admire his own work. 
Blair was equally gushing about Gould, a close friend.  
Other key figures wrote extensively at the time, including Peter Mandelson and 
Alistair Campbell. In various newspaper articles and books they broadly follow 
the Gould analysis on how the party should change. There is remarkably little 
disagreement amongst the main players, at least pre 1997, as to how the media 
campaign was - and should have been - run. Their analysis can be explained 
using the framework outlined in the previous chapter. They sought to change 
the media context by gaining the support of the press; they changed the 
message so it was more appealing to the press and used an effective 
messenger in Tony Blair; and the methods they used were tried, trusted and 
efficient. 
Several journalists have written in detail about the era. One of the key critics of 
the party's media tactics under Blair was former BBC correspondent Nick 
Jones.31 Jones says the relationship between Downing Street and News 
International was unique for a number of reasons. Alistair Campbell's role as 
Blair's press secretary was unlike anything that had gone before. He was a 
gifted former tabloid journalist with close contacts in the tabloid world and he 
enjoyed unprecedented freedom to speak to the Prime Minister and to speak for 
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the Prime Minister. He was also dealing with Rupert Murdoch - a newspaper 
proprietor with unrivalled power. Murdoch's News International published The 
Times, Sunday Times, The Sun and News of the World, with a market share 
that far outstripped anything that had gone before. Jones's insights are limited 
for this work, however, as they concentrate on the period after 1997.  
Other journalists have also written about the importance Blair placed on media 
relations. Former BBC Political Editor Andrew Marr describes the Blair 
government as the most media obsessed in modern times and while initially 
successful "it became a kind of grubby, smeared opaque and distorting glass 
between Blair at his best and the rest of the country - just the opposite of the 
effective communication it had promised to be a dozen years before."32  
Lance Price offers an insight from both sides, having been a BBC political 
reporter before joining Labour's media team. He makes two broad comments 
about the relationship between Blair and Murdoch. He says the following is a 
close approximation of the words used by someone who had accompanied Blair 
to address senior News Corporation staff in Australia in 1995. "If Murdoch was 
left to pursue his business interests in peace he would give Labour a fair 
wind."33 He also states that as a BBC journalist pre-1997 he was aware that all 
talk of restricting media ownership suddenly ceased.  A substantial amount of 
Price's work adds weight to the argument that the media was able to directly 
influence Labour Party policy.  
More primary material is available in statements given to the hearings of the 
Leveson Inquiry: Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, which began on 
July 13th 2011. Though largely an inquiry into the press and phone hacking, 
module 3 of the inquiry specifically looked at the relationship between the press 
and politicians. There were a number of highly relevant witnesses called and I 
have chosen to focus on the following (the dates evidence was submitted are in 
brackets): Lord Mandelson (May 21st 2012); Rupert Murdoch (April 26th, July 9th, 
July 23rd 2012); Tony Blair (28th May 2012); Lance Price (July 9th 2012); Alistair 
Campbell (November 30th 2011, May 14th 2012) and Andrew Neil (July 9th 
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2012).These statements were accessed online via the National Archives 
website. They were published after the witness either appeared in person and 
gave oral evidence or submitted a statement which was taken as read.  
The final report was published in November 2012. As its main focus was on 
media ethics, a lot of the material submitted by witnesses was overlooked. 
Much of it failed to make the final summary and, subsequently, was ignored by 
the press. The unedited statements provide an insight into the relationships 
between the government and media. There are some frank comments from 
Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson, two men who always choose their words very 
carefully. It amounts to an admission that they allowed the media to have a 
direct influence on the formation of policy and strategy just prior to the 1997 
general election. The statements from Lance Price and Andrew Neil continue in 
a similar vein. These primary source statements need to be viewed in context. 
They were given in 2012, with the benefit of hindsight and perhaps with a few 
old scores to settle. This is particularly relevant to the comments by Neil. He 
had effectively been sacked by Murdoch 18 years earlier with relations further 
soured by Neil's frank description of their relationship in a book published two 
years later.34 This type of history can be limited. Some of the statements were 
written by the individuals themselves in response to questions by the inquiry. 
Respondents had the chance to reply as they wished and this could often lead 
to evasive answers which were sometimes not followed up. Other statements 
were written and "taken as read" by Lord Leveson. In some cases, the 
statements were written up from the oral hearings of the inquiry. As Italian oral 
historian Alessandro Portelli explained, oral history tells us "not what people did 
but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, what they now 
think they did."35 Nevertheless, the statements provide a valuable insight and 
offer perhaps a more honest view of events 15-20 years later and away from 
the heat of battle.  
Various news archives have also provided information for this dissertation. On 
August 10th 2017 BBC Radio 4 broadcast an hour long interview with Tony Blair 
                                            
34
 Andrew Neil, Full Disclosure (London: Macmillan, 1996). 
35
 Alessandro Portelli, Peculiarities in Oral History, in History Workshop Journal volume12 issue 
1 (1981), p.96-107.  
 
  
 19    
 
by the historian Peter Hennessy. In it, Blair gives some fascinating insights into 
how he dealt with the media and suggests he may have credited it with too 
much influence. The full interview remains available online in the BBC Radio 4 
archive.36 Archives featuring the BBC 6 and 9 O'clock News have also been 
accessed to analyse examples of what could be termed news management or 
agenda setting by Labour. By cross referencing news agendas of the TV news 
with editions of the The Times and Daily Mail we can see that there is some 
evidence to suggest that the broadcasters were following the political agenda 
set by newspapers. 
A broad narrative emerges from a review of the literature but it also highlights 
where this dissertation might make a contribution. There is very little to dispute 
the claims that post 1983 Labour's media relations needed a major overhaul. 
Changes in organisation and tactics brought in over the next few years leading 
up to the 1987 election appear to have been widely welcomed and effective.  
Defeat at that election was not unexpected and Neil Kinnock continued the 
process towards the 1992 election. Serious debate begins to emerge here 
about the necessity and effectiveness of the major shifts of policy to the centre 
ground. This debate reaches a peak after the '92 defeat, with the party at a 
crossroads under the leadership of John Smith. Events then continue at an 
astonishing pace with the sudden death of Smith and the election of Tony Blair 
as party leader. Organisation and the methods used to deal with the media 
were overhauled still further. But the biggest changes during this period were in 
terms of policy.   
Success at the polls has acted as vindication for the modernisers' media 
strategy between 1983 and 1997. Though controversial at the time, the changes 
in organisation, tactics, policy and relations with the right wing press have been 
viewed as necessary to regain power. The existing literature broadly reflects 
that view. However, the primary sources I have used suggest a growing body of 
qualitative evidence that serious mistakes were made. Shaw offers an in depth 
critique of some of the media tactics and the need for drastic policy changes. 
Comments from Blair and Mandelson to the Leveson Inquiry suggest they now 
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accept they over-estimated the power of the press and allowed it too much 
influence over policy. This is supported by the statements from Lance Price and 
Andrew Neil. The following chapters will use all this material to form a narrative 
analysis based on the general elections of 1983, 1987, 1992 and 1997. 
Throughout the discussion, the framework for understanding a media campaign 
- the message, the messenger, the methods and the media context - will be 
applied. The basis of a new analysis emerges, where the media was deemed to 
be so important it was able to directly influence strategy and policy.  
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Chapter 1 
Donkey Jackets and the Longest Suicide Note in History: 
Labour, the Media and the 1983 General Election. 
By any measure, the 1983 general election was a disaster for Labour. It clearly 
performed badly, securing 209 seats with 27.6% of the vote and leaving 
Margaret Thatcher with a 144 seat majority. It was the party's worst 
performance since 1918 and in terms of share of the vote only just beat the 
Liberal/SDP alliance. Why the party suffered such a defeat is a complex 
combination of factors and is not the main focus of this work. It is clear the 
media strategy had not worked well and the campaign had suffered as a result. 
According to a MORI poll during the campaign, 46% of respondents had a 
worse opinion of Labour than at the start.37 Butler and Kavanagh state: "It is 
difficult to think of any campaign fought by a major party since the war that was 
more inept than Labour's in 1983."38 This chapter will examine why the media 
strategy failed so badly. My period of research begins in 1983 so there will be 
no detailed examination of the run up to this election, rather this chapter will be 
used to provide the basis for a more in depth analysis of the campaigns of 
1987, 1992 and 1997. In 1983, there were weaknesses in all four areas of the 
framework. The messenger, Michael Foot, was unable and unwilling to engage 
with the modern media landscape. Even then, his job was made harder 
because the methods for dealing with the media were highly disorganised, if 
they existed at all. Finally, the left wing message the party hoped to put across 
was guaranteed a bad reception in the hostile right wing media context.  
The messenger, Michael Foot, was clearly a key factor in why the media 
strategy failed so badly. Criticism of his dealings with the media was 
widespread and largely justified. Bob Franklin describes Foot as a leader whose 
considerable skills for political rhetoric had been learned at factory gate 
meetings. "By the 1980s, the process of packaging politics had reduced 
distinguished politicians to the status of curious anachronisms."39 Furthermore, 
he could not or would not adapt to the growing TV age. As Franklin points out, 
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politicians seemed reluctant to devote two hours to rallying a room full of the 
party faithful when they believed that a twenty second clip on television would 
prove electorally more effective in converting the doubters.40 Unfortunately for 
Foot, his forte was spending two hours rallying the faithful with powerful oratory 
and not reducing his message to a single 20 second sound bite. He was a man 
out of time, according to Franklin.  "The political skills which were once so 
crucial for devastating opponents in Parliament….were redundant in an age of 
political communication via broadcast media," he states.41 
In the Tory supporting press his appearance was ridiculed. Aged 69 with 
unkempt grey hair and thick glasses he could often be seen walking with a stick 
wearing a donkey jacket. The Sun asked in 1983: "Do You Seriously Want this 
Old Man to Run Britain? "42 John Gaffney describes Foot as a commanding 
presence at party conference and public demonstrations but a weak performer 
on television.43 Foot's Labour colleague, Austin Mitchell, a former TV presenter, 
said: "He was hopeless in the personal interview style of the 1980s, peering 
short sightedly around, with a tendency to interrupt which alienated viewers, 
coupled with a willingness to follow lines set by the interviewer instead of 
seizing the initiative, obscuring issues instead of speaking simply."44  
Gaffney suggests this was a prelude to "celebrity politics" and a wider cultural 
questioning of the role and status of intellectuals. But he also questions the 
inadequacy of a strategy that allowed media criticism of Foot to go 
unchallenged.45 For much of the media he was a ban-the-bomber, scruffily 
attired at the Cenotaph who disrespected the war dead. Where was the counter 
attack portraying a patriotic, non-pacifist who attended the Cenotaph - not in a 
donkey jacket - but in an overcoat from Harrod's? Others have highlighted some 
of the positive aspects that emerged during the early 1980s, admittedly from a 
new young left that Foot did not particularly represent. Rohan McWilliam says 
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the 1980s were, in fact, a creative period for the left. "It’s true that the right won 
the economic argument in the 1980s. But what’s also true is that the left won 
the social and cultural argument. Its emphasis on the rights of minorities and the 
celebration of difference created a politics of inclusiveness which refashioned 
the social agenda."46 
Foot certainly has to take some of the blame for failing to engage with the 
media but there is little evidence of a media strategy to promote Foot. Indeed, 
the only evidence of managing Foot's leadership appears to be for negative 
reasons - by promoting more of a team approach to the media. This is flawed 
because, firstly, in a TV age the focus will naturally fall on the leader and, 
secondly, the divisions within the party leadership meant there was not much of 
a "team" to promote. This situation certainly mattered - but to what extent ? 
Despite the contrasting portrayals of Foot and Thatcher in the media, a 
Gallup/BBC poll suggested policies were more important. According to the 
survey, when voters preferred the policies of one party but the leaders of 
another, they split 5:1 in favour of the policy.47 A survey of this nature is open to 
the criticism that respondents offer the answer they believe shows them in the 
best light. They may tell a questioner that policy is more important than 
personality when, in reality, they are being swayed by the portrayal of an 
individual in the media.   
The message to be communicated was undoubtedly left wing. When it resulted 
in election defeat, critics of the leadership within the party said it proved the 
message was wrong. Supporters of the leadership said the message was right 
but the communication of it was wrong. For Foot in 1983, there was truth in both 
of these assessments. The right of the party claimed Labour's message was as 
anachronistic as its leader. The manifesto was out of touch with the electorate 
and represented the end of "Labour's long death march" which had begun in 
1970, according to Gould.48 It was certainly ambitious and unashamedly from 
the left. It proposed a massive programme of renationalisation, withdrawal from 
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the EEC and a non-nuclear defence policy. Some of the policies appeared to be 
popular with the public, particularly the aim of reducing unemployment, but this 
was often undermined by the belief that another policy - leaving the EEC - 
would make unemployment worse.  
Whatever the policies, they were certainly not communicated effectively. 
Political communication usually requires a simple clear message conveyed by 
party spokespeople with consistency, confidence and clarity. But with so much 
disagreement in 1983 that was always going to be difficult. The issue was 
highlighted in a memo by the party's research department prior to the election: 
"There is a real need for Party spokesmen at all levels to have confidence in the 
policies they were trying to project…only if we have that confidence can we 
hope to convince a deeply sceptical electorate."49 They failed miserably. The 
years of Labour disunity were described by Denis Healey as creating "a highly 
unfavourable public image based on disunity, extremism and crankiness and a 
general unfitness to govern."50  
The level of disunity is surprising. There were signs that the left was beginning 
to lose influence in the party and in 1982 the NEC shifted to the right. By the 
time of the election, the two groups charged with drawing up the manifesto - the 
shadow cabinet and the NEC - both had right wing majorities. So why did the 
party produce a manifesto that was described by MP Gerald Kaufman as the 
longest suicide note in history?  Eric Shaw suggests an answer.51 The meeting 
to approve the manifesto was the shortest of its kind ever. A left wing manifesto 
largely based on a document from the previous year was nodded through by a 
right wing leadership. Shaw says this may have been a deliberate move by the 
right. Opinion polls suggested the ship was about to sink so it may as well sink 
with a red flag tied to its mast. That would certainly explain the resounding lack 
of enthusiasm and unity in promoting the manifesto and it certainly achieved its 
goal. Shaw says: "..the fact that Labour was trounced on a left wing manifesto 
                                            
49
Butler / Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1983, p. 63. 
50
Thomas, Popular Newspapers, p. 91.  
51
Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1945. 
 
  
 25    
 
did much to engrave upon its mind the view that it could never win on a left wing 
platform."52 
Media context is another factor in my framework that was highly unfavourable to 
Labour in 1983. Support for the Party at the time of the general election was 
restricted to the Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror but it was the nature of the 
coverage from the rest of the tabloid press that was most striking. According to 
Thomas, coverage showed a marked polarisation in 1983.53 Quality papers 
demonstrated a deeper level of sophistication and analysis than before, but: 
"the tabloids treated their readers to a diet of unadulterated propaganda 
throughout the news columns."54  According to the former Sun journalist Chris 
Horrie, on one campaign event Michael Foot was attending, freelance 
photographers were told by the newsdesk: "no pictures of Foot unless falling 
over, shot or talking to militants."55 
A sea change against Labour had been identified by Callaghan at the 1979 
general election. Around 70% of newspapers supported the Conservatives and 
coverage was marked by an intense hostility. This was an intensity that was to 
grow over the coming years. By 1983, Margaret Thatcher, though controversial, 
inspired in her supporters an almost evangelical loyalty and two of them, Sir 
David English and Kelvin Mackenzie, edited the multi-million selling Daily Mail 
and The Sun respectively. They represented a brash political culture on the rise 
on both sides of the Atlantic. A right wing press and a left wing party resulted in 
Labour's worst press coverage for over 50 years at the 1983 general election. 
One dramatic story appeared in the Daily Mail on May 16th which predicted in 
its headline: "35,000 JOBS LOST IF FOOT WINS." This was the story of a 
"leading official" at car makers Nissan saying the company would scrap plans 
for a new plant if Labour - committed to leaving the Common Market - were 
elected. The story continued the following day with the Industry Secretary 
Patrick Jenkin backing the claims, although he was hardly an impartial source. It 
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is interesting to note the official statement from Nissan ran on page two saying 
the election of a Labour government "would not substantially affect" their plans. 
Thomas offers this in isolation as an example of the naked bias of the story.56 
But the statement goes on to say company plans would not be affected 
because: "On the best information we have so far, it is difficult to see Britain 
pulling out of the Common Market." In other words, Nissan didn't think their 
plans would be affected by Labour for the simple reason they didn't believe 
Labour would implement its own policy. Surprisingly, the Daily Mail did not 
appear to pursue the key point with the company - what if Labour did fulfil its 
manifesto pledge? Whilst this rather undermines this example of media bias, 
the Press Council did rule that the original article was likely to mislead readers. 
Thomas is right to point out that much of the damage had already been done as 
the story was picked up by television news.57 The story featured at least twice 
on BBC national news, with one piece on the main 9 O'clock News bulletin on 
May 16th 1983. All three major parties were included in the report which did 
nothing to dispel fears that a huge number of jobs were at risk.58 
The media context was being affected by the growing importance of television, 
although the tabloids still retained huge influence. Presenter John Tusa's 
comment on BBC Newsnight that this had been "a television election, for good 
or ill"59, may have been something of a cliché but TV produced its largest ever 
volume of general election output. Its influence was certainly growing. Blumler 
and Kavanagh say at this point television was in the second of three distinct 
phases of political communication.60 They describe an era of loosening party 
loyalties together with the growing importance of TV as a medium of political 
communication. The result was four broad transitions. Voters were now less 
exposed to party propaganda and one sided political debate: this was gradually 
being replaced by legally enforced fairness and impartiality on TV news 
bulletins and other programmes. Television also reached more people - and 
reached those who were traditionally less exposed to political messages. This, 
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Blumler and Kavanagh argue, undermined long term influences on political 
outlook and  "started to give way to more short term ones, such as current news 
events, government's immediate successes and failures, and their opponents' 
lines of attack."61 TV news had an effect on the timing of political events. They 
had to be staged to give enough time for broadcasters to film and edit them and 
get them ready for broadcast. The language of politics also had to change with 
the creation of the "soundbite". Messages had to be short, simple and easy to 
understand on first hearing. If answers were long and complicated the viewer 
switched off.  Finally, in a visual medium, politics becomes personalised. The 
party is represented on television in a very personal way, by its leader. 
The methods of communication had to be changed to deal with this new 
environment. As we have seen, Labour largely failed in this area at the 1983 
general election. There were some within Labour who understood the influence 
of the media and realised TV was becoming more important. Unfortunately, 
Michael Foot was not amongst them. Roy Hattersley called the campaign a 
"shambles" during the campaign itself and lambasted Foot for failing to 
communicate in the television age.62 The Party not only failed to understand the 
importance of these changes, it also had an ideological aversion to them. Many 
on the left regarded television as the creator of a shallow US presidential style 
of campaigning. But this attitude was not always prevalent with Labour. In the 
1960s Labour showed some enthusiasm for new communication techniques 
and attempted to use them in its relations with the media. As Shaw states: 
"Wilson grasped the importance of television which he exploited in a masterly 
fashion."63 But by the early 1980s the party had swung to the left and 
campaigning which appeared to trivialise politics was shunned in favour of more 
traditional methods. In this vein, there was a series of mass demonstrations and 
marches addressed by Foot and other senior party officials over issues such as 
jobs and some of these events attracted large crowds. However, given the 
media context, it is hardly surprising they failed to attract much positive 
coverage in the press. There were also grassroots campaigns involving public 
meetings, leafleting, door step canvassing and local campaigns over issues 
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such as hospital closures. As the party became sidetracked with more in 
fighting even these methods became less and less effective. 
 "Shambles" "mayhem" and "disaster" were some of the words used by critics to 
describe the methods used in dealing with the media in the 1983 general 
election campaign. Gould listed example after example.64 Michael Foot's driver 
would wander into strategy meetings if he felt like it; Roy Hattersley told Foot he 
wasn't communicating for the TV age - Foot told him it was too late to change; 
the press office was in mayhem, according to Peter Mandelson; election 
broadcasts were a disaster, according to Patricia Hewitt.65 Nick Grant was 
appointed Labour's first Head of Press, Publicity and Advertising just a few 
months before the election - a telling factor in itself. The very structure of the 
party "guaranteed a chaotic communications strategy for the election later that 
year," according to Franklin.66 Grant's department was underfunded, faced 
indifference and sometimes hostility from party members and approval for all 
decisions had to come from the party's 40-strong campaign committee. 
It is difficult to exaggerate how poor Labour's media strategy was in 1983. The 
leader was not adept at dealing with the traditional media, never mind the new 
kid on the block - television. Foot was unable and unwilling to engage with 
broadcasters. The idea that he might develop a media "image" would not be 
entertained just at a time when the image of a leader on television was 
becoming increasingly important. In terms of the message the party was trying 
to get across, it was certainly left wing and ambitious. Many of the policies, such 
as nuclear disarmament, were simply not popular with the public and were also 
unlikely to gain a fair hearing in the press. Some policies were popular but the  
communication of these messages was hampered because the party was 
disunited and a majority of those charged with communicating the manifesto did 
not believe in it. As a result, messages were confused and contradictory. The 
media context of 1983 meant even a united party would have struggled to get 
its message across. An overwhelmingly anti-Labour media staunchly behind 
Margaret Thatcher was ruthless in its coverage. Finally, the party did not have 
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the organisational skills, staffing and strategies to promote its message. The 
only positive outcome of the 1983 general election result was to kick start a 
transformation in all of these areas.  
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Chapter Two 
Militants and Loonies: 
Labour, the Media and the 1987 General Election.  
The Labour Party which fought the 1987 general election was very different to 
the one which fought and lost so badly in 1983. This was most notable in terms 
of the message and the methods. There is little doubt the changes to Labour's 
policies were hugely significant. The new message was promoted through a 
media strategy transformed in terms of organisation and tactics. It was also 
delivered by a leadership more united and more willing and able to deal with the 
media in general and television in particular. What had not changed was the 
fiercely anti-Labour media context of the still highly significant newspaper 
industry. This chapter will examine the fundamental changes to the organisation 
and implementation of the media strategy in 1987. This was a campaign that 
some modernisers described as setting the template for all future Labour Party 
campaigns. At the same time, it was these modernisers who argued that policy 
changes, although significant, had not gone far enough. 
Changing the message occurred despite Kinnock coming to the leadership with 
a reputation as a left winger. However, he had broken with the Bennite left by 
supporting Healey for the deputy leadership in 1981. He viewed moving policy 
to the centre ground as essential after the 1983 general election and was 
amenable to the use of pollsters and marketing experts in that process. 
Progress was slow as Kinnock became embroiled in internal battles with the 
Militant Tendency and the miners' strike. But from late 1985, the policies 
deemed to have cost Labour the election - leaving Europe, unilateralism and the 
Tories privatisations and council house sales - were being scrutinised. The anti-
EEC stance was quickly dropped, as was opposition to council house sales. A 
compromise was reached on the ownership of the privatised British Telecom 
and British Gas. Private shares would be converted into special new securities, 
allowing Labour to argue these utilities had been returned to the public sector.67 
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Equally, it left them open to the Conservative charge that millions of new 
shareholders' investments were being put at risk.  
The issue of unilateralism was the trickiest of all to reassess. Kinnock had been 
a life-long unilateralist but was increasingly convinced by the researchers and 
pollsters that it was unpopular with voters. As late as 1986, research suggested 
that the policy was disliked by the vast majority of the electorate. By then, as 
even Kinnock's belief in the policy began to falter, it was deemed too late and 
too risky to the leadership for it to be changed. According to The Guardian,68 
Kinnock told his shadow cabinet at a two day strategy session in 1985 that the 
commitment to unilateralism had to be beyond question to allow him room to 
manoeuvre on other policy issues. The paper reported that the Party's aim was 
to keep defence a low profile issue at the election - a hope that was crushed by 
the Tories. Defence was ruthlessly exploited during the campaign and was cited 
as one of the key reasons why lapsed Labour voters didn't return to the fold. 
One enduring campaign poster showed a soldier with his hands in the air and 
the caption: "Labour's policy on arms."69 
Two other areas where policy changes were more muted is in the areas of tax 
and industrial relations. The party's manifesto on spending was radically 
different to 1983 but this did not stop Tory supporting newspapers from 
exploiting the issue. Labour said its programme of investment would cost £6bn 
immediately. There would be increases in pensions and child benefit paid for by 
reversing some of the government's tax cuts, introducing a wealth tax and 
borrowing around £3bn. Attacks quickly followed. Treasury ministers suggested 
the real figure was closer to £35bn. The Daily Mail took up a theme that 
Labour's tax proposals in its manifesto lacked detail leading to headlines about 
"Labour's secret tax plan"70 arguing there were secret proposals to raise 
national insurance. 
Labour had initially pledged to repeal all the anti-trade union laws of the 
Thatcher government. But now Labour's increasing use of opinion poll research  
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was delivering several uncomfortable messages. This one was pretty stark - the 
new laws were supported by the majority of the population and any repeal 
would be seen as capitulation to the union "barons". On the other hand, Kinnock 
couldn't risk a battle with the unions that he might lose and hand a gift to the 
Tories, who would be able to argue this was proof that the unions ran Labour. A 
compromise was reached resulting in most of the laws being repealed but 
ballots on strike action and elections for a union's executive would remain. 
These changes were too subtle to alter the overall picture but trade union power 
didn't seem to be a key issue in the election. In fact, Daily Mail columnist Frank 
Chapple wrote less than two weeks before polling day: "The best news about 
the election so far is that we haven't heard very much about the trade unions."71 
The most significant changes to Labour's media strategy after the 1983 defeat 
were the methods. Just as policy changes took some time to implement, so did 
new methods for dealing with the media. However, when changes came they 
proved to be groundbreaking for British politics. Peter Mandelson replaced Nick 
Grant as Director of Communications. The fact that Mandelson was a former 
television producer illustrated perhaps the single most important development in 
the party's media strategy for the '87 campaign - the importance of television 
news. Gould says this strategy had been identified the previous year and it 
would involve memorable pictures and stories featuring the leader and a select 
group of shadow cabinet members. It would be tightly organised and recognise 
the need to update stories in the news cycle. This was the concept that stories 
could be challenged and turned to your advantage by feeding journalists a 
constant diet of updated or brand new information and pictures. Gould 
recognised its importance: 
You must always seek to gain and keep momentum or it will pass 
immediately to your opponent. Gaining momentum means 
dominating the news agenda, entering the news cycle at the 
earliest possible time and repeatedly re-entering it with stories 
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and initiatives so that subsequent news coverage is set on your 
terms. 72  
One of the key media strategy techniques associated with TV was known as 
agenda setting. This was a bid by the parties to try to influence and control the 
TV news agenda, rather than leaving it to the tabloid press to do so. The daily 
news agenda was often set by newspapers because national daily newspapers 
were published early in the morning. This set a tone of breaking news and a 
challenge to other news outlets to respond. When I was in TV newsrooms 
locally and nationally in the 1990s and 2000s, it was an open secret and the 
subject of dark humour that the first newspaper the senior journalists would look 
at would be the Daily Mail. It is obvious to all journalists that one source of news 
is other news outlets. This is especially important to TV journalists because 
gathering TV in the 1980s was complicated. Finding, filming and editing stories 
takes time and journalists are under pressure to fill their bulletins. 
Consequently, TV journalists look to the press for a head start. The Labour 
press team aimed to step in and provide that head start by finding stories and 
organising the filming. 
Mandelson and Patricia Hewitt had decided that June 4th 1987 would be a day 
of campaigning devoted to the health service, traditionally one of Labour's 
strong policy areas. A few years earlier, the media strategy may have involved 
the leader giving a rather dull speech in drab surroundings, hardly the most 
riveting of TV news stories. Mandelson in particular realised more preparation 
was needed if health was to run in the media - and particularly on television.  
The day before the health initiative, a filming and photo opportunity was 
arranged for the press involving Kinnock talking to nurses coming off duty at St 
Thomas's Hospital in London. When Labour launched its health campaign 24 
hours later, TV reporters already had some relevant pictures in the can. In 
addition, reporters were also provided with details of a young boy called Mark 
Burgess, who had been waiting many months for a heart operation. Words and 
pictures provided by the Labour Party; a simple and effective tactic, as Patricia 
Hewitt explained:  
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We basically said, what is going to matter in this election 
campaign is television, and what's going to matter on television 
is the pictures, and we said, right, for each day there will be a 
theme and the pictures will be tied to the theme. And it was 
really simple, but nobody had ever done it.73 
The detailed planning shows an impressive understanding of how TV news 
works. With strict campaigning events for each day, broadcasters often found it 
difficult to set the agenda because the pictures they had told a different story. 
As Hewitt said: "In 87, what we did was catch the media completely unprepared 
and it was only about halfway through the election that they suddenly found out 
that whatever they asked Neil about, the pictures were always the pictures we 
wanted."74 The piece that ran on BBC 9 O'clock News 75 did indeed feature 
pictures of Mark Burgess filmed at his home and included details of his story. 
There was an extra piece of good publicity for Labour as, in her response, 
Margaret Thatcher admitted to using private medicine because she wanted to 
go to the hospital she wanted when she wanted, remarks that were deemed 
highly insensitive by Kinnock and David Owen. But agenda setting on TV did 
not necessarily transfer to the tabloid press. The Daily Mail's response the 
following day was "Kinnock puts sick heart boy in front line of votes fight." 76 The 
story implied using Mark Burgess as a case study in the story was exploitative. 
The story was written in a straight news style but the insinuation in the headline 
is clear. 
This was just one new tactic amongst a whole range of innovations. A root and 
branch re-organisation began with media operations now being organised 
separately to the party structure. There was a vast expansion in the use of 
outside experts from the worlds of PR, polling and market research, brought 
together under the grouping of the Shadow Communications Agency. Again, 
this was separate to the party structure thus avoiding direct interference from 
MPs who were unhappy with the new direction of the party and might want to 
question the SCA's findings. Changes to presentation, the wording of 
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campaigns, organisation and planning all brought a new air of professionalism 
to the Labour campaign. There is evidence that this had at least some effect on 
improving the party's image as generally being unfit to govern. Gould described 
the early success of a social policy campaign.77 Originally titled "Freedom and 
Fairness," Gould insisted on ditching the political language favoured by Kinnock 
and used instead consumer language. It was renamed "Labour: Putting People 
First." The same principles were used in the re-branding of the party itself. The 
red rose first appeared at the 1986 party conference and was generally well 
received.  
In stark contrast to 1983, the 1987 media campaign was holistic. Even policies 
that were deemed by the opinion polls to be unpopular were analysed and 
aggressively promoted. Joe Napolitan was an American political consultant who 
worked with Labour in the mid-1980s and was one of several analysts who 
highlighted the problems with the defence policy. In a memo to Kinnock he 
advocated going on the offensive with the argument that the Tories were 
running down conventional forces and "putting all their eggs in a nuclear 
basket."78 Although the campaign ultimately failed, Labour put forward a forceful 
argument that Britain would be safer by switching from nuclear to conventional 
weapons. 
This period of organisational and tactical change from 1983-1987 is crucial to 
Negrine's analysis.79 He argues there had been a transformation in political 
communications since 1945. He uses "transformation" as change that goes 
beyond the response to the political and technological situations of the time. 
When political parties lose elections they automatically try to find out why. The  
failure to get their message across is often cited as a cause and that leads to an 
examination of a party's relationship with the media. Thus, we see attempts by 
politicians to engage with the new media of the day, be it radio, television or the 
internet. But it is the nature of television that has perhaps had the greatest 
influence leading Negrine to note: "..one could perhaps see it as transforming 
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the nature of political communication."80 I have highlighted some examples 
above showing how this change is transformative, as Negrine defies it as using 
skills that are qualitatively different to what went before. Certainly, television 
changed the way politicians looked and behaved. It also changed the way a 
party had to deal with the TV media and that meant new techniques such as 
agenda setting, as outlined above by Hewitt.   
The Party's new messenger - Neil Kinnock - was a vast improvement on his 
predecessor. He was more willing to engage with the media and at least make 
an attempt to use television. This new relationship didn't get off to the best of 
starts. The official announcement of Kinnock's leadership victory was to be 
made at the 1983 party conference in Brighton. Officials arranged for Kinnock 
and his wife Glenys to be filmed walking along the seafront and Kinnock took it 
upon himself to take his wife on to the beach and to the water's edge.  As 
waves came crashing in, Kinnock tumbled into the water, leaving journalists 
rubbing their hands at the story they'd just landed. Matters slowly improved. His 
image was smartened up with dark suits and white shirts and a new short 
haircut, some suggested this was to make his hair look less like that of miners' 
leader Arthur Scargill.81  
Four years before, it was inconceivable that Labour would have wanted the 
focus of the TV lens on Michael Foot. He would not have welcomed it and it is 
doubtful there would have been a strategy in place to deal with it. Gould 
welcomed any strategy that would see the campaign as Kinnock against 
Thatcher. "If we were going to fight a negative campaign, I thought we needed 
at least one positive, which had to be Neil Kinnock. Presenting Labour in a 
positive light will be difficult, presenting Kinnock in a positive light much less 
so."82 At this stage, Gould suggests, Kinnock was modernising quicker than the 
party itself, leading him to say that Labour looked better but it had not become 
better. "Although the planning was extensive, the foundations were built on 
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sand," he said.83 The culmination of this was a remarkable party political 
broadcast which was to become known as "Kinnock: The Movie." It was a 
personal depiction of the Labour leader and his wife, Glenys, and finished not 
with the word 'Labour' but 'Kinnock.' According to Gould, his ratings went up 
16% overnight.84  Nevertheless, Kinnock was a mixed TV performer and prone 
to the occasional gaffe. He was a man passionate about words and undeniably 
a great orator but, like Foot before him, he found the 20 second soundbite a 
difficult task. When interviewed by David Frost, Kinnock gave the impression 
that Labour's response to an invasion by a foreign power would be civil 
resistance. Or, as David Owen put it: "He wants Dad's Army back."85   
Dealing with television was one thing - the tabloid press was another. In this 
sense, Labour was limited in what it could do to change the media context. 
Certainly, the tactics and emphasis on TV news had some effect but the 
tabloids still remained influential in terms of circulation and agenda setting. 
Kinnock's relationship with Fleet Street remained deeply troubled. Hostilities 
began almost as soon as Kinnock was elected. There were smears against him 
and his wife86 and the situation became so dire that his press secretary Patricia 
Hewitt considered abandoning the daily press conference as "they allow the 
newspaper journalists to set the agenda and we know where they stand."87 
Following on from the miners' strike and the battles with Militant, were stories 
about Labour's "loony left", some with more substance than others. The Party's 
"image" was attacked by the press on several fronts. There were the actions of 
the prominent left wingers who were running local councils, such as Ken 
Livingstone at the GLC. They pursued equal rights policies that may seem 
progressive today88 but were often portrayed as a waste of taxpayers money by 
the tabloids. In the run up to the 1987 general election the Daily Mail ran a 
steady stream of "loony left" stories. They included one headlined "Gay Rights 
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Championed on Leaked List"89 which found one motion out of 101 submitted to 
the London Labour Party supported the promotion of "positive images" of 
lesbians and gay men. Another grimly warned of the threat to human life itself  
because of "the gay revolution encouraged in the classroom by loony left 
councils."90 The dire warning came from local government minister Dr Rhodes 
Boyson who criticised the idea of positive images of homosexuals "as if they 
were equivalent forms of life."91 
Labour's links with the trade unions were also criticised by the press. The 
tabloids argued this was a party controlled by union leaders, which included in 
their eyes unsavoury individuals such as Arthur Scargill. Despite gross 
exaggeration, Labour's formal links to the Trade Union movement proved to be 
consistently unpopular with the electorate, although its significance is 
debatable. Lumped together with the "loony left" tag, it was this constant diet of 
negative stories that had the greatest influence on voters, according to Andrew 
Neil.92 He said the news and feature pages were far more important in shaping 
political attitudes than the clearly partisan but rarely read opinion pages. 
 If, day in, day out, in a relentless and sustained manner, you 
consistently and constantly demean one political leader while 
praising and promoting his/her rival, then over time you can 
sway your readership by the drip, drip, drip of negative 
coverage.93 
One particularly acrimonious episode with the press concerned a trip to the US 
by Kinnock in March 1987. Some had advised Kinnock not to go as the thorny 
issue of Labour's unilateral defence policy was never likely to go down well. 
After the trip Kinnock described a convivial meeting where President Reagan 
had accepted Labour's policies. This was contradicted by reports allegedly from 
the President's spokesman Marlin Fitzwater that the meeting had been short 
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and Reagan had warned Labour's policies would put NATO at risk. This gave 
the tabloids a double hit and they didn't hold back. The Daily Mail headline was 
"The Revenge of Reagan" and the sub heading "President blasts Kinnock over 
defence policy" 94 Inside, the paper raised its suspicions over the differing 
accounts of the meeting from Kinnock and Fitzwater. Fitzwater's use of the 
phrase "polite and business-like" was translated for the Mail by an American 
journalist. Apparently this meant Kinnock's team had been spoken to "like they 
were Russians." Alistair Campbell was on the trip, reporting for the Daily Mirror 
and described the reporting of his colleagues as a conspiracy. "Once Neil 
Kinnock became leader, the bias of the press was something I wrote about from 
time to time," he told the Leveson Inquiry. "Mrs Thatcher's Number 10, The 
Reagan White House and the UK press conspired to trash Mr Kinnock."95  
The Conservatives were re-elected with another huge majority in 1987 but 
Labour's media strategy had shown massive improvement. According to the 
framework, three of the four key factors had improved, admittedly from a very 
low base. Perhaps the biggest strides were taken in the methods that were 
employed to deal with the media. Organisation and efficiency had been 
improved and provided a template for all future Labour Party general election 
strategies. One of the main architects, Philip Gould, described tight organisation 
and discipline with a focus on television. "This is how the 1987 election was 
fought and it is essentially how Labour has fought every national election 
since."96 Shaw agreed with much of the analysis of the election, describing a 
"professional and skilfully executed campaign which, with its mastery of modern 
communication techniques and the cohesion and discipline it displayed, 
impressed media commentators and did much to restore the Party's battered 
morale." 97 
Compared to 1983, Labour's message had been well articulated by its chief 
messenger - Kinnock. It also got a better reception from the public. Kinnock, 
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although not a natural TV performer, had adapted to the age but, according to 
pollsters, his approval ratings still remained problematic. There had been big 
shifts in policy to the centre ground but brutal attacks by the media remained, 
particularly on Labour's economic, tax, and defence policies. For the 
modernisers, policy had not been shifted far enough especially on the economy 
and Blair certainly saw this as a serious weakness. "One of the most common 
fallacies in politics is that you can have great communications and lousy policy 
and win. You can't ," he said. "The 1987 election was a classic of this genre."98 
Finally, the media context is the one element of the framework that showed little 
change and continued to damage Labour. True, the presentation of Kinnock for 
TV and the methods used to deal with TV journalists had vastly improved from 
four years before. There was evidence that the TV news agenda could be 
influenced by a well organised visual event. But the tabloid press remained 
powerful and hostile.  Thomas suggests the 1987 election marked "the peak of 
sustained press hostility towards Labour."99 Even so, it was to remain a thorn in 
Labour's side at the next general election.  
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Chapter Three 
A Nightmare on Kinnock Street: 
Labour, the Media and the 1992 General Election. 
Many in Labour thought it beyond the party to win in 1987, given the position 
they were coming from. Whilst the three per cent increase in the share of the 
vote to 31 per cent was a disappointment most believed the downward spiral 
had been halted and the foundations were being laid for one last push to take 
them over the line and into power. The media strategy for the 1992 campaign 
bore many similarities to the successful campaign five years previously and this 
chapter will look at them in detail. The media context remained extremely 
hostile and the methods used to deal with the media were broadly the same. 
However, there were some subtle differences in these areas. Press coverage 
altered slightly and key figures were missing from the organisation of the media 
operation. The role of the messenger, Neil Kinnock, will also be analysed as will 
the changes to the message through continued policy reviews.  
Election defeats are analysed in detail by the losing party and 1987 was no 
exception. A major review of the party's message began almost immediately. 
The prevailing argument in the party in terms of policy was to continue the shift 
to the centre ground in the belief that this would appeal to more voters. A whole 
range of areas were re-examined and resulted in what Shaw called "The 
abandonment of Keynesian Social Democracy." He puts it very simply and 
accurately. "The driving force behind programmatic renewal in the Labour Party 
since 1987 has been the search for votes." 100  
On the big issue of the economy, the National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research said that by 1990 the differences between Labour and the 
Conservatives were "narrower now than they have been for about twenty 
years." 101 The party went in to the 1992 election with fairly modest proposals on 
the economy. There was to be an increase in pensions and child benefits 
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funded by higher taxes on the richest 20 per cent of tax payers. The shadow 
chancellor's mantra was that "we can't spend what we haven't earned."102 
These changes were possible because of Kinnock's tightening grip on the 
National Executive Committee and strategic moves to reduce its influence 
anyway. Shaw explains that although the Policy Review was jointly directed by 
the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet the front bench was very much the senior 
partner. By the end of 1989, he said, Kinnock was able to overturn policy on 
even the most controversial issues.103 Nowhere was this more obvious than in 
the last remaining truly controversial policy within the party - unilateralism. 
Kinnock was increasingly of the view that Labour could not win with it still in the 
manifesto and was prepared to put his leadership on the line to force it 
through.104 The 1992 manifesto was clear: "Labour Will Retain Britain's Nuclear 
Capability". This change would have caused a party rebellion just a couple of 
years earlier but the new policy went through with remarkably little public 
disagreement. 
Another policy deemed to have cost Labour votes in 1987 was nationalisation. 
Gradually, the list of companies to be returned to public ownership became 
smaller and smaller until it was a list no more. By 1990 it was one word - water - 
and two years later even this had been reduced to a desire for public control, 
rather than ownership. It appeared that political ideology had not only been 
changed but the very idea of being ideological was outdated and undesirable. 
As Kinnock told the Observer, "the question is what an industry does, not who 
owns it. Ownership is a matter for the ideologists."105  
Ideology had become something of a dirty word by the late 1980s. As Kinnock 
implies above, ideology in the Labour Party suggested the rigid dogma of the 
left, unwilling to change and adapt. For the modernisers, ideology had to be 
abandoned and replaced by flexibility to deal with the new political realities. 
There is certainly something in Shaw's claim that the driving force behind these 
policy changes was the desire for votes but the changes have their own 
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coherent narrative, indeed their own ideological basis. Shaw106 says the 
modernisers believed the problem for Labour was that it had failed to adapt to 
the changes in society. It was still essentially a party for the 1960s where there 
were tightly knit occupational and residential communities, union membership 
and class consciousness was high and there was a natural affinity for 
collectivist ideals. The party had failed to recognise this society no longer 
existed. Economic and technological developments had seen to that and the 
political upheavals that followed had been successfully exploited by the 
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. This had created an individualistic 
society mistrustful of governments which "waste" money, where individuals 
should be trusted to spend more of their own money instead of having it taken 
away in taxes. The modernisers were keen to show they were in touch with 
voters with "evidence" from opinion polls and focus groups.  Philip Gould used a 
whole range of data throughout his time advising Labour. The most important 
presentation to the party was in 1985.107 There was a "fault line", he said, 
between what Labour had become and what the electorate wanted. On one 
side there was Labour's nationalisation, unilateralism and tax increases. On the 
other was the electorate buying shares, council houses and revelling in Britain's 
born again military might. Defeat in 1987 re-enforced the modernisers' belief 
that the transformation in policy had to be completed. To do that, Old Labour 
policies had to be ditched and then the electorate had to be convinced they 
were gone for good.  
Modernisers had a curious argument for changing Labour policies. They argued 
voters did not like current policies and the proof was in general election results 
and a huge amount of polling data. But voters were looking at those policies 
through the prism of a biased media so how could policies be judged fairly? 
Shaw offers a critique of this thinking.108 He says party strategists pursuing 
modernisation held a major source of power by being in control of gathering 
and, more importantly, interpreting opinion research findings. This was done via  
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the Shadow Communications Agency which ran separately to the party 
structure. Consequently, there was very little challenge to the interpretation of 
this data. For example, in April 1988, the SCA presented findings which said: 
"Respondents thought Labour would increase taxes for everybody, with the 
result that the rich would be driven abroad, ordinary people would be worse off 
and there would be no incentive to work."109 Statements like this, says Shaw, 
were accepted as the truth rather than being challenged.  He also says it 
assumes the responses given for not voting Labour were the full explanation for 
their actions. "Rather as if a psychologist accepted, without further analysis, as 
a satisfactory explanation of the behaviour of their subjects, the reasons offered 
by the subjects themselves."110 In addition, the reasons offered by respondents 
were taken to be an accurate reflection of what the Labour Party actually 
represented. "No attempt appears to have been made by strategists to explore 
why Labour was portrayed as a party of minorities and other poorly regarded 
groups - and why, indeed, this so aggravated people," he added. Shaw also 
highlights another shortcoming, the assumption that opinions were based only 
on the impact of relatively recent events. So, for example, those who thought 
Labour untrustworthy in the mid 1980s must be basing their views on events 
such as the Winter of Discontent. Shaw argues the picture is much more long 
term. Finally, Shaw challenges the idea from strategists that voters believed the 
party to be one of extremists sympathetic to minority groups because that's 
exactly what it was. He highlights research depicting the demonisation of certain 
groups in the media - groups that just so happened to be associated with 
Labour such as immigrants, social security recipients and trade union 
"militants." This antagonised voters not because Labour had policies unduly 
sympathetic to them but because they associated these groups with the 
negative characteristics bestowed on them by the media. The left seemed 
reluctant to engage in the policy debate with their own polls and market 
research, probably for a number of reasons. They were divided and  
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disorganised and had an ideological suspicion of pollsters and market 
researchers.  Dennis Skinner typified the left's response following a market 
research presentation in 1987. "Another load of bloody rubbish," he snarled.111  
The messenger for the 1992 general election was still Neil Kinnock, although 
there was more of an emphasis on a team approach. At his best, Kinnock was 
an accomplished media performer. Articulate and passionate, he often came 
across as a political leader with a common touch. But he was also prone to 
verbosity and the occasional blunder.  The 1992 campaign saw an attempt to 
move away from a personal approach to a team approach. Those deemed to be 
telegenic and capable of delivering the 20 second soundbite for TV, such as 
Blair, Brown, John Smith and Robin Cook, played a bigger role in the campaign. 
But television's tendency to personalise general election campaigns meant it 
had little effect and press coverage portrayed the election as a battle between 
three men: John Major, Neil Kinnock and Paddy Ashdown.  
Sebastian Berry 112 is surprised at just how much Kinnock was shielded from 
the press when it could be argued his experience may have proved vital against 
an unknown quantity like John Major. Following the media attacks in 1987, it 
was understandable campaign managers wanted to shield him but Berry says 
they opted for a "safety-first" campaign.113 Philip Gould also describes a party 
leader isolated and remote from the campaign. He hardly saw Kinnock in the six 
months before the campaign started and describes him as "a man trapped in a 
glass prison."114 Gould is unsure whether this was down to Kinnock himself or 
his advisers but remains ambivalent about the consequences. He describes a 
plan for the campaign when Kinnock would cut loose and become his real self 
but argues it didn't work because Kinnock had changed - older, wiser and 
different.115 In the end, Gould says, the electorate could not warm to him. "I 
couldn't imagine Neil Kinnock in Downing Street. Nor could the electorate."116 
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The 1992 media context for Labour showed some limited signs of change. 
Newspaper circulations continued to decline but they were still huge. The Sun 
sold 3.5 million copies per day and the Daily Mirror 2.9 million. That should not 
disguise the fact that the other four biggest selling daily tabloids with a 
combined daily readership of 4.5 million all supported the Conservatives. Their 
influence on setting the news agenda remained key and they were often as 
partisan and as vicious as they were five years earlier. The Daily Mail ran 45 
articles117 criticising the party's tax plans in the five weeks leading up to the 
general election. Headlines included "If You Make It They'll Take it" ; "Mr Rising 
Price" and "We've 17 days to save the country."118 These stories were spread 
throughout the news and features sections where they have their biggest 
impact, rather than in the little read editorial columns.  
There were, however, some subtle changes. Although, there were many 
examples of personal and vitriolic anti-Labour reporting Berry argues the 
predicted negative and dirty tabloid campaign largely failed to materialise.119 
Thomas suggests120 a number of reasons for this, foremost being the absence 
of Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher and Rupert Murdoch were ideological 
soulmates and without her as leader connections between the Conservatives 
and News International became weaker. It was not just that she was no longer 
leader it was the nature of her removal that angered some editors and 
proprietors. An atmosphere seemed to emerge that the current Conservative 
leadership deserved punishment for dumping her. Criticism of John Major 
appeared in normally loyal newspapers. Kelvin MacKenzie would come to 
loathe him. 
Other reasons cited by Thomas for the slightly muted press coverage was the 
relatively poor campaign from the Tories and the tightly controlled and largely 
gaffe-free Labour campaign. Indeed, remove The Sun, Daily Mail and Daily 
Express, from the equation and the treatment of Labour from the press was 
more sympathetic than 1987. The party received the surprise endorsement of 
the Financial Times and also four of the nine national Sunday newspapers. The 
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support of the FT was significant and something of a coup, given its standing in 
the financial world and the fact that a readership consisting of higher social 
groups was being urged to vote Labour. However, its daily circulation of a 
modest 290,000 hardly changed the overall picture in terms of readership of the 
Tory supporting press.  
Attempts were made by Labour to try and improve media relations. Charles 
Clarke describes relationships with the tabloids as being frozen following the 
1987 campaign. This was due not only to the battering delivered by the tabloids 
but also the fallout from the trade union dispute at News International's new 
headquarters in Wapping. The breaking of the print unions had led to 
widespread picket line violence and many Labour MPs refused to speak to NI 
journalists. Clarke organised a meeting with Sun executives at Wapping in 
January 1992 to try and foster some sort of relationship. "We had four hours at 
Wapping - me, Kelvin and a whole group of others going through things - and to 
his credit Kelvin never leaked it. And I told Neil the next day and he was furious 
that I had done it."121 Although the story wasn't leaked there appeared to be 
little improvement in relations. Political journalist Nick Jones argues the meeting 
may even have been counter productive:  
Notwithstanding the fact that Labour’s first, faltering entreaties 
to the Murdoch press had been rebuffed and might be 
considered nothing more than an historical footnote, they were 
a key moment in the unfolding narrative. By signalling pre-1992 
that they were already desperate to come to terms with the 
Sun’s unassailability, Kinnock’s inner circle had bolstered the  
bravado of its editor Kelvin MacKenzie, as evidenced by the 
paper’s subsequent vilification of Kinnock throughout the 1992 
campaign.122 
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The Sun ended its coverage on election day with the headline: "If Kinnock wins 
today will the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights." This was 
followed shortly after by a headline boasting: “It’s the Sun wot won it!” 
In his written statement to the Leveson Inquiry in 2012, Andrew Neil123 says 
during his career the treatment of Kinnock by News International was the 
seminal development in relations between politicians and the media. He says 
the partisan nature of the British press reached its zenith in the ideologically 
charged 1980s. "All leading politicians found themselves incurring the wrath of 
this partisan media; but none more so than Neil Kinnock - and his most virulent 
tormentors were the News International tabloids," he said. He argues the day to 
day vilification of Kinnock throughout the campaign certainly had some effect on 
the outcome, even if "It's the Sun wot won it !" was too bold a statement. He 
said the country had fallen out of love with the Tories under John Major but 
voters could not bring themselves to support a Kinnock-led Labour Party. It was 
these doubts that were encouraged by tabloid coverage:  
I believe the Tory-inclined press - and especially the Murdoch 
Sun (read by millions of the C1/C2 swing voters Labour needed 
to win) - did have an influence in denying Labour victory. As 
polling day approached, voters were having second thoughts 
about Neil Kinnock. The Sun encouraged these doubts. It did 
not have the power to change their minds; but it could nudge 
them in a direction they were already inclined to travel.124 
Just as some Conservatives and the press were quick to boast of their role in 
the Tories' election victory others were keen to play down their influence, 
suggesting Labour was looking for someone else to blame rather than itself. Sir 
David English at the Daily Mail said: "The fact of the matter is that it was 
Labour's policies that helped swing the election to the Tories."125 Others used 
the argument that their papers do not have such an influence over their readers. 
How much influence the tabloids had is not for discussion here. Indeed, James 
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Thomas said in some ways the peak of tabloid hostility to Labour was in 
1987.126 What is important is recognising that Labour thought the tabloid press 
was influential and their attempts to gain some control and influence largely 
failed.  
Labour's media campaign did not reach the heights of 1987. Some of the 
methods backfired and there was some organisational disruption. In 1992 the 
tabloids continued to be a declining part of the media landscape and generally 
hostile to Labour. The Party continued its strategic move to rely on television to 
get its message across. Tactics it had adopted in 1987 were deployed again. 
Setting the TV agenda was the key aim of the party's daily press conferences 
and this meant organising more "pseudo events" and photo calls to make sure 
the TV reporters had decent moving pictures to go with their stories. As part of 
Labour's environment campaign, MP Ann Taylor was pictured on the banks of 
the River Don in South Yorkshire beside a river turned orange due to industrial 
pollution. These pictures and an interview with Ann Taylor featured in a BBC 6 
O'clock News story about pollution levels rising because of regulations being 
relaxed in the run up to privatisation.127  
Controlling the media agenda is difficult and in contrast to 1987, the press and 
broadcasters were becoming more aware of media manipulation. It backfired 
spectacularly for Labour over the "Jennifer's Ear" party political broadcast. The 
film used actors to tell the real life story of a little girl waiting for NHS treatment, 
as opposed to another girl whose parents could afford to pay for private  
treatment. Perhaps because the broadcast used actors, journalists began 
digging around to find the "real" Jennifer. The issue of NHS waiting lists quickly 
began to unravel for Labour, as the real life characters emerged and various 
conflicting stories surfaced. There were claims Jennifer's waiting time was not 
caused by NHS cutbacks, her father and grandfather allegedly expressed 
outrage at the broadcast and confirmed themselves as Conservative 
supporters. In an attempt to bring attention back to the main issue, Labour 
published a dossier of ten other NHS waiting list cases. Again this was seized 
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upon by the media and within hours four had asked for their names to be 
withdrawn after being inundated by media attention. There were also claims that 
journalists had been given at least one ex-directory telephone number. As the 
row rumbled on, it undermined Labour's claims to be trustworthy and fit for 
government. There were disputes about who said what and when and an aura 
of disorganisation surrounded the Labour media team.  
A major Labour Party rally was planned in Sheffield for the final week before 
polling day. It was designed to enthuse the troops and lift spirits for a final 
campaigning push. Critics are correct to say it came across as over-confident, 
glitzy and Americanised. Something not helped by Kinnock's over enthusiasm 
and cringeworthy shouts of "we're alright…" from the vast stage. The timing of 
the rally also rather suggested that Labour's campaign was drawing to a close, 
just as John Major's was stepping up for the final few days. 
In his criticism of the 1992 campaign, Berry highlights the final week, which 
featured the Sheffield rally and a focus on proportional representation. "For all 
the emphasis placed by the Labour Party on the importance of effective media 
relations, it is extraordinary that the final week strategy agreed by the campaign 
management team proved so woefully inadequate."128 PR emerged as a key 
issue as polls close to election day suggested the most likely outcome was a 
hung parliament. Labour had promised a referendum on PR, a relatively minor 
policy issue. Senior campaign managers were prepared for its emergence in the 
final week of the campaign because a Charter 88 "Democracy Day" was being  
held. But the real damage was done when Kinnock refused to say if he 
supported PR during a TV interview featuring the other party leaders. Once 
again, this developed into an issue not about policy but about fitness to govern. 
Gould makes the astonishing confession: "He (Kinnock) hadn't worked out what 
he would say if asked."129 
Gould dismisses these criticisms.130 He argues that the Sheffield Rally had little 
effect saying "it was barely on the news and was hardly noticed". This is 
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incorrect, it featured prominently on the BBC's 9 O'clock News that evening with 
a report lasting over three minutes - a substantial duration for a television news 
package.131 It looked extraordinary in several respects. The concept is bold by 
British standards - resembling an American political convention. Undoubtedly it 
is triumphalist, with shots of Kinnock arriving by helicopter and members of the 
shadow cabinet introduced on stage as the crowds applaud wildly. As Berry 
points out,132 it implied the Labour campaign was coming to an end with one 
week to go. A week seen by many as John Major's best of the campaign.  
On "Jennifer's Ear" Gould claims it to be one of the most effective and 
successful party election broadcasts ever shown. "The chaos around it was 
caused by organisational confusion and a communications breakdown for which 
I alone was not responsible."133 The ensuing row actually boosted Labour's poll 
ratings, according to Gould. Berry says it shifted focus from one of Labour's 
strong issues - health - to one of its weakest - competency.134 In a similar vein, 
Gould dismisses the effect of the PR debacle despite Mandelson and Gordon 
Brown believing it cost the party dear. Gould said there is little evidence it 
caused significant damage to the party, although it was not an ideal way to end 
the campaign.135 
Television had become central to the new Labour leadership's media strategy. It 
was modern, influential and, crucially, it was deemed to be fairer to Labour 
because of the legally enforced impartiality laws. However, this strategy has 
been challenged by Shaw.136 He argues the reliance on television by Labour 
was misplaced for a number of reasons. Firstly, he suggests, it shows an 
inadequate grasp of the way voters received incoming information. Labour's 
modernisers relied on the idea that a message is either accepted or rejected by 
an audience according to the degree of affinity it has with existing dispositions. 
This thinking, according to Shaw, was outdated at that time with most cognitive 
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psychology suggesting the process was much more complicated. This raised 
serious doubts about Labour's preferred "advertising mode" of message 
delivery and its reliance on agenda setting (keeping the news agenda on issues 
favourable to you rather than your opponents). The advertising mode was 
equivalent to the "peripheral route to persuasion" described by Petty and 
Cacioppo.137 This suggests voters are persuaded by the style and presentation 
of a message, hence Labour's obsession with presentation and soundbites. 
"This approach," according to Shaw, "can be effective but..it was inappropriate 
for Labour."138 This was because it was best suited to relatively straightforward 
matters and even then were less likely to result in long term behavioural 
change. Soundbites, according to Shaw, "rendered them an inadequate vehicle 
for the exposition of an argument."139 
Shaw's second criticism of the reliance on TV surrounded the issue of agenda 
setting. As described earlier, this refers to trying to control the news agenda but 
it also advises against raising issues deemed to be the strong suits of the 
political opposition. Its rationale was based on the idea of cognitive dissonance 
- the idea that attitudes are difficult to change because of the psychological 
discomfort triggered by exposure to conflicting arguments. This left key areas of 
policy - such as the economy - to be fought over on the Conservatives own 
terms. Labour merely argued it wouldn't change the market economy but would 
manage it better. Better to close down these issues and try to concentrate on 
those that are seen as Labour's strong points, such as health. Shaw contends 
that if Labour had so desired they could have challenged the Conservatives on 
the economy by using a system called "framing," described as an attempt at 
persuasion not by changing one's attitude to a particular situation but by 
changing one's perception of the situation to which one is responding.140 This 
was successfully done by the Conservatives over their handling of 
unemployment and economic downturns. In short, they managed to persuade 
voters they weren't to blame for these particular issues. Shaw examined 
Labour's failed attempts to persuade voters over the economy in 1992. The 
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economic team of Brown, Beckett and John Smith were good on television and 
had a host of moderate (and pre-tested) policies. But they did not convince 
voters because there was no attempt to re-frame the debate about the failures 
of the market economy. New Labour supporters said the failure on the economy 
at the 1992 election was because of a lack of enthusiasm for private enterprise. 
Shaw argues the failure was due to the choice being between who could 
manage capitalism better. If it is about the best management of capitalism, he 
argues, voters will choose the party that is the most enthusiastic supporter of it 
and the party that represents those who are keen participants in it - business.141 
Shaw's third criticism of the use of TV by Labour concerns what he regards as 
an in built bias against the Party. TV's aim for balance often relies on the use of 
experts to explain complicated matters and offer context in broadcast friendly 
soundbites. But, says Shaw, these experts tended to be individuals from 
industrial firms, trade associations and financial institutions often supportive of 
the kinds of policies favoured by the Conservatives. Moreover, they were 
deemed to be "experts" by journalists who, according to Shaw, represented 
broadly conservative broadcasting hierarchies.142 Increasingly, any economic  
analysis tended to come from City economists and financial executives who 
were generally more right-wing than the alternatives in academia or the trade 
unions. Indeed, a Guardian poll cited by Peter Goulding in The Guardian on the 
4th of April 1992 showed 90% were Conservative in their political sympathies. 
Errors occurred because of a lack of the tightly controlled organisation which 
had been so prominent in the 1987 campaign. The fact that these mistakes 
happened when Peter Mandelson and Patricia Hewett were no longer involved 
is no coincidence. Hewitt left for the Institute of Public Policy Research following 
disagreements with chief of staff Charles Clarke. Mandelson left to pursue his 
ambitions to become an MP. But his departure was long and protracted and led 
to damaging splits in the party organisation. The new Director of 
Communications was John Underwood but he resigned shortly after, leaving his 
replacement, David Hill, with less than a year to prepare for a general election. 
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"Open warfare had been declared for the past year and where nothing was in 
place for the campaign," said Gould.143 This also led to further criticism within 
the party about the role of the Shadow Communications Agency. It had been 
set up by Mandelson in 1986, with responsibility for all of Labour's 
communications strategy. It was separate to the rest of the party organisation 
and there were grumblings about its direct access to the leader, its lack of 
accountability and its dominance of the campaign. When that campaign failed to 
deliver electoral success, criticism became more vocal and more public. The 
Guardian's political editor Michael White reported that in the days after the 
defeat the knives were out for the SCA.144 He said MPs like John Prescott were 
determined to reclaim control and White also reported complaints from 
Mandelson allies like Jim Parish, the party's senior campaigns officer, that the 
SCA had staged a "wholesale takeover of the campaign."145 
Labour's methods for dealing with the media also took on some subtle but 
important changes in 1992. A number of tactics were brought together and 
became known as spin doctoring. Mandelson was the master. His tactics in the 
late 1980s were described in The Independent newspaper: "He wheedles 
journalists, cajoles them, takes them into his confidence, spurns them, adapts 
his tone to theirs. Then if they fail to present the party his way, he bullies, 
pesters and harries them."146 In other words, Mandelson and others would 
spend time with individual journalists putting the party's side of the story and if 
that is not how it appeared in print or on air, complaints would follow. 
Mandelson chose to focus his efforts on the more Labour friendly broadsheets 
such as The Guardian and The Independent believing that the broadsheets 
were more influential in setting the TV news agenda than the tabloids. 
Mandelson left the campaign in 1990 to pursue his political ambitions but the 
tactics were in place. Complaints to the press would be swift and vociferous. If 
the complaint was not about what a journalist had done it would be to contradict 
a particular line from the other parties and attempt to move the news agenda 
back on to Labour territory. This became known as rapid rebuttal. The new 
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tactics soon became the subject of complaints, with accusations of bullying. 
These claims, according to commentators such as former BBC journalists 
Andrew Marr and Nicholas Jones, would damage Labour in the long run.  Marr 
states: "As relations deteriorated between the media and Number 10, spin 
began to look less like a brilliantly clever and successful way of governing a 
liberal democracy, and more like a terrible mistake."147 For Labour in opposition, 
however, the tactics were successful and some of the less aggressive media 
management such as agenda setting and rapid rebuttal have become standard 
practice. 
Jones was berated on many occasions by Campbell and Mandelson.148 He 
recalls one incident when he was the subject of complaints from Labour's press 
team for a story in 1991 which actually concerned a smear against Neil 
Kinnock.149 The Sun had run a story trying to associate Kinnock with a 
millionaire businessman at the centre of a fraud investigation. The Sun's  
political editor Trevor Kavanagh told Jones that one of the paper's reporters had 
phoned the Fraud Squad to get information. Jones spotted a scoop. Here was 
confirmation that Sun reporters could phone police officers directly to get stories 
at a time when the Metropolitan Police was trying to crack down on leaks. 
Labour's Jack Cunningham demanded an inquiry - as Jones reported. But then 
Labour's press team had a change of heart and tried to kill the story. Despite it 
being an attempt to smear Kinnock, they wanted it out of the media to prevent 
any link between Kinnock and a potentially criminal businessman. They feared 
Jones's continued pursuit of the story was damaging. Press officers called the 
newsroom with threats of complaints to the BBC's Director General. Jones' 
story was now "not news" and instead he should have been reporting Kinnock's 
speech on health. 
Whilst the result of the 1987 election was to be expected, the 1992 result was 
bitterly disappointing for Labour. For all the organisational changes and policy 
battles, the party's share of the vote went up by only 3.6 per cent. In terms of 
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the media campaign, it was not on a par with 1987 although many 
commentators felt Labour had had the best of the campaign. The message had 
been changed considerably but seemingly with little effect. Shaw's criticism that 
policy changes were being based on wrongly interpreted evidence is convincing 
but cannot be seen in isolation. The media context had improved slightly but it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the press was so hostile any Labour policy 
would have been criticised. Labour's economic plans came under fire, despite 
the highly respected Financial Times giving them a cautious welcome. Tax and 
spending again remained the main election battleground and Labour suffered.  
The messenger was a more tightly controlled Neil Kinnock with a greater role 
for some of his more telegenic spokespeople. This did little to deflect the 
spotlight and the personal attacks in the media appeared at regular intervals. 
Some of the methods which had worked well in 1987 were used again 
successfully but there were signs journalists were becoming increasingly 
resentful of being manipulated and in some cases harassed or bullied. Some 
tactics in the media campaign did backfire and it is unlikely such mistakes would 
have been made if Mandelson and Hewitt had been directly involved.  
Neil Kinnock resigned immediately after the defeat. What could broadly be 
termed "modernisation" had been tried for two general elections in a row and 
Labour had lost both. There were two differing conclusions. Either the 
modernisation project was abandoned in favour of another approach, or it was 
accelerated for one final push. The results of the past two general elections had 
yielded modest gains but in terms of media strategy the improvements had 
been greater. The methods had been transformed and the messenger greatly 
improved. The message had been radically changed but with little effect and the 
media context was still frustratingly hostile. After the 1992 general election the 
party was at a crossroads.  
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Chapter Four  
A Tory Press to a Tony Press: 
Labour, the media and the 1997 General Election. 
Defeat at the 1992 election was a surprise to some in Labour but a crushing 
disappointment for all. It left the party with a serious dilemma over its future 
direction. Had "modernisation" failed, as the traditionalists argued ? Or had it 
not gone far enough, as the modernisers argued? In terms of Labour dealing 
with the media there was a great deal of praise for its strategy. Some argued 
that the party had once again lost the election but won the campaign, despite 
some errors in the final weeks.  This chapter will highlight both the continuities 
and change between 1992 and 1997. The organisation of the party's media 
strategy and the methods used remained broadly the same. The message and 
the tone of that message changed drastically as policy continued its rightward 
shift. The messenger was also new. Tony Blair was a politician for the television 
age, both in terms of looks and presentation of policy. These three factors 
together created the most radical change of all - the transformation of the media 
context. Newspaper hostility was finally tamed with the change from a "Tory 
press to a Tony press."150 
After Kinnock's resignation, the election of John Smith as leader was seen as a 
victory for the traditionalists and frustration for modernisers. Smith had said: "If 
radical change involves the Labour Party subverting its principles and aborting 
its mission, then I'm conservative in that very narrow sense."151 Gould's 
response was: "I knew my project wouldn't get very far with him."152 But then on 
May 12th 1994 Labour suffered a political and emotional shock - John Smith 
died and the party was looking for another leader. The modernisers were 
guaranteed to triumph. The only serious candidate from the left was Bryan 
Gould and he had fallen out with Smith and returned to his native New Zealand. 
That left Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as the favourites and after Brown agreed  
                                            
150
 Franklin, Packaging Politics, p. 142. 
151
 Jon Sopel, Tony Blair: The Moderniser, (London: Bantam Books, 1995), p. 135. 
152
 Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, p.156. 
 
  
 58    
 
to stand aside Blair took 57 per cent of the vote in the leadership election, which 
also included John Prescott and Margaret Beckett. The momentum was now 
with the modernisers. They had a clear strategy for dealing with the media. As 
far as they were concerned, the media had an important role in determining the 
outcome of the general election. As a result, those making changes to the party 
between 1994 and 1997 had this question in mind: "How will it be viewed by the 
media?" That included changes in policy; the presentation of the new leader; 
the tactics that were to be used in dealing with the media; and an all-out 
campaign to either "neutralise" the hostile press, as Alistair Campbell put it,153 
or to gain its support.  
Building new relations with the media became one of the key aims of the new 
leadership. It was an ambitious attempt to change the media context, born of an 
almost obsessive desire to make sure the party did not suffer the same fate at 
the hands of the press as Neil Kinnock. It is difficult to underestimate just how 
much the role of the media had affected the new leadership. The BBC's former 
political editor Andrew Marr was sympathetic to their predicament. "Blair, 
Brown, Mandelson and Campbell had watched Neil Kinnock being torn to 
shreds by hostile journalism, abetted by a pretty ruthless Number 10 operation 
in the Thatcher era, and had resolved 'this will never happen to us again.'154 
The former BBC political correspondent Nicholas Jones has written extensively 
about spin under the New Labour governments. "Labour had been left with no 
alternative but to come to terms with the inherent danger for any future leader of 
the destructive force of The Sun’s political reporting."155 
At the forefront of this drive were Blair himself and his press secretary Alistair 
Campbell. Both were eager to build relationships, particularly with the Murdoch  
press because - quite simply - they thought it would help them win the election.  
Blair believed the press to be important in influencing voters and driving the 
agenda of the broadcasters. Campbell agreed and was equally driven.  "More 
often than not," said Jones, "his benchmark in deciding what to do next has 
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been the attitude adopted by The Sun."156 The new leadership's belief in the 
power of the media is hard to exaggerate and is perhaps not surprising after the 
1992 result. Hugo Young writing in The Guardian shortly after Blair became 
Prime Minister recalled an interview he had done with the Labour leader just 
before election day when it was clear he was going to win. "Nobody, he (Blair) 
vigorously insisted, should underestimate the matchless importance to his 
victory of the endorsement he received on the first day of the campaign from 
The Sun newspaper."157 Former Sunday Times editor Andrew Neil told the 
Leveson Inquiry that it was difficult to judge just what an effect papers like The 
Sun had on the result: 
 
Whatever the reality, the more significant fact is this: it is what 
many Labour politicians and strategists, especially those 
coalescing around Mr Blair’s New Labour Project, believed. 
Never again, they concluded, should Labour be so much on the 
wrong end of a hostile press. It was time, the Blairites believed, 
to see if the Labour lamb could really lie down with the Murdoch 
lion - and not be eaten.158 
 
For media relations to change so dramatically they had to be two sided and it 
soon became clear that Murdoch was open to persuasion. The Sun in particular 
was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the Major government but it was a 
feeling that was shared throughout Conservative-supporting Fleet Street. There 
were a number of interlinked factors that created a press that was open to 
changing its political allegiances during the mid-1990s. There was a personal 
dislike of John Major and a desire to "punish" the party for ditching their 
favourite, Margaret Thatcher. There was also a degree of boredom with a 
Conservative government that appeared to be running out of steam. One 
problem for John Major was that he was not Margaret Thatcher, the Prime 
Minister adored by large sections of the press. Thomas identifies a "snob mob" 
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of newspaper executives who loathed Major for similar reasons that they 
loathed Kinnock - he was not one of them.159 Major had left school at 16, in 
stark contrast to the Fettes and Oxford-educated Tony Blair. Major, in turn, 
loathed the press, leaving relations in tatters together with a wider media 
operation that was ineffective. Not only did this affect the communication of 
policy but also the poor handling of an astonishing number of "sleaze" 
allegations that emerged at the beginning of the campaign. This all added to the 
notion it was time for a change.     
I had personally witnessed some of the anger felt at The Sun for John Major. I 
was working in the newsroom on a news reporting shift when Major appeared 
on the TV screen during a news bulletin. Kelvin Mackenzie stopped to watch 
and let rip a tirade of abuse that was personal as well as political. McKenzie 
would argue he was merely articulating the apparent decline in support for the 
Conservatives which seemed to be reflected amongst newspaper readers. By 
the end of 1994, half of Sun readers were voting Labour and support for the 
Conservatives had gone down by a third amongst Daily Mail and Daily Express 
readers. By the time of the 1997 election Stuart Higgins was in the editor's chair 
at The Sun and said if the paper had supported the wrong side it would have 
been a journalistic and commercial nightmare.160 
Newspaper support was there for the taking but it would need more than 
disaffection with the boy from Brixton to make it work. Andrew Neil says New 
Labour was pushing at an open door but there remained one more stumbling 
block - policy.161 Neil describes the relationship between Murdoch and Margaret 
Thatcher as one of ideological soulmates. Murdoch was a Thatcherite, rather 
than a Tory. How a right wing newspaper proprietor could swing so favourably 
behind a centre-left political party was due to a unique confluence of events, 
according to Neil. There was the disillusionment with the Tories as previously 
described. There was also the personal appeal of a young, up and coming 
politician in Tony Blair who increasingly looked like a winner. Murdoch liked to 
back winners. The crucial factor tipping the balance was the message being 
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brought by Blair - a message that would not disrupt Murdoch's business 
interests despite a desire among many in the Party to cut Murdoch down to size 
for the savaging Labour received over the previous decade. 
Meetings between Blair and Murdoch began shortly after Blair became leader. 
According to Murdoch himself, he met Blair as the opposition Labour leader 
nine times between 1994 and 1997 and most of these were instigated by 
Blair.162 The most publicised date of the Blair/Murdoch romance took place on 
the Hayman Islands in Australia in 1995. Doubts still remained about Blair 
amongst senior editorial staff at The Sun but the proprietor had made his 
decision. Blair was to be endorsed outright and on the first day of the campaign. 
Perhaps Murdoch too had some reservations. The headline read: "The Sun 
Backs Blair" rather than The Sun backs Labour. It illustrated the paper's 
confidence in the new leader, rather than the Labour Party itself, and reflected 
the concerns of many senior executives at the paper, including its editor.   
The transformation in press support was stunning. With Michael Foot at the 
helm in 1983, Labour had the support of just two of the 17 national newspapers 
- The Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror. There was little change between 1987 
and 1992, although the party gained the support of The Guardian for both 
elections and the Financial Times in 1992. By 1997, Labour had the support of 
11 out of 19 national newspapers, representing over 62% of newspaper 
readership. Even those papers continuing to support the Conservatives, 
showed signs of wavering. On Blair's election as party leader a Daily Mail 
editorial stated: "We have entered a new political era. And John Major has a 
real fight on his hands."163 According to Thomas, any notions of a press "shift to 
the left" after 1992 were incorrect. Instead the political editor of The Sun, Trevor 
Kavanagh, was nearer the mark: "It's not The Sun that's changed. It's the 
Labour Party. They've moved in our direction and a long way."164 
The media context had been well and truly altered by Labour's enthusiastic 
pursuit of the Tory press. However, statements to the Leveson Inquiry and from 
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BBC archives provide further evidence that senior party figures regret the extent 
of this pursuit and admit that the media was allowed to directly influence policy. 
Blair himself now seems to regret how much importance he placed on relations 
with the tabloids. He told BBC Radio Four last year that he probably became 
too affected by the media attacks on Kinnock and that gave them too much 
influence over new Labour. He told presenter Peter Hennessy: "I think what we 
should have been doing is trying to get to a situation where the media were not 
so empowered and instead what we did was empower them significantly 
because we played into that theme or that climate that they operated in."165 
Having said that, he remained of the view that the press during Neil Kinnock's 
time could be incredibly important: "I watched what he went through and could 
see how incredibly destructive it was cos at that point the media was immensely 
powerful in its ability to shift opinion and it was so negative on him that it really 
didn't matter whether if what he said was sensible or not sensible."166 
The courting of the press was largely about courting Rupert Murdoch's News 
International newspapers and, in particular, The Sun. Andrew Neil explained to 
Leveson why those papers in particular were important.167 Firstly, The Sun was 
the biggest selling daily newspaper of the time, whose readership was largely  
made up of working class and lower middle class swing voters. Secondly, to 
use Neil's own words, those papers were prepared to be "politically 
promiscuous."168 The Mirror Group had always been solidly Labour, The Mail 
and Telegraph groups were likely to stay loyal to the Conservatives, the 
Express was a shadow of its former self. News International was not only 
powerful, its support was up for grabs. Neil argued the influence of The Sun 
was waning and Blair was pushing at an open door: 
 
It (The Sun) needed to back Mr Blair to show it was in touch 
with its readers much more than Mr Blair needed its backing 
(though he did not realise that at the time since he was still 
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obsessed with what had happened to Neil Kinnock). The Sun 
was following the crowd rather than telling it what to think.169  
 
Nor is this a view just shared in hindsight. The Guardian columnist David McKie 
writing shortly after the 1997 election said Murdoch was so disillusioned with the 
Major government that he had come to want Blair and some senior Labour 
politicians thought their courtship was never necessary.170    
 
The task of winning over the media would, undoubtedly, be much easier if the 
message being delivered was more in tune with the viewpoint of most national 
newspapers. Policy changes continued from 1994 although much of the ground 
work on changing policy had been undertaken by Neil Kinnock. Opposition to 
council house sales had been dropped, re-nationalisation largely abandoned 
and the policy of unilateralism had also been discarded. Yet the modernisers 
still felt Kinnock's heart wasn't in it. Gould stated: "Neil Kinnock did not change 
the Labour Party far enough, fast enough."171 Although, Kinnock was hampered 
by his early battles with Militant and sidetracked by the miners' strike, Alistair 
Campbell also believed he remained ideologically ambivalent about change. "I 
think he knew that there were an awful lot of things in the Labour Party that 
were wrong, but he also had a sentimental attachment to some of the things 
that were wrong as well."172  
Kinnock had already ditched most of Labour's controversial policies. For Blair 
there were two remaining stumbling blocks. Changing economic policy and then 
persuading voters the Party really had changed. Much of the Blair influence was 
about tone and presentation rather than practical policy, although this was no 
less controversial within the party. He acted quickly to spell out the direction of 
policy in a number of speeches, which were to lay the foundations of the 1997 
manifesto. He began within months of his election by addressing what were 
seen by modernisers as voter-friendly attitudes that were not associated with 
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Labour. He spoke about community and family values and also criticised the 
party's existing policy of the abolition of selection in education. In terms of 
image and symbolism, there was little that could rival Clause Four of the Labour 
Party constitution, which committed the party to the "common ownership of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange." This pledge to a huge 
expansion of the state was more symbolic than aspirational but it was exploited 
by Labour's opponents. It was, to the modernisers, the classic symbol of Old 
Labour and a dead weight around the party's neck. Its abolition in 1995 did not 
have much of an impact on policy but the message it sent out was powerful, 
particularly to the right wing media.  
In the summer of 1996, Labour began drawing up the manifesto and promoting 
it through a series of simple, clear pledges. The method would then be 
deployed at the general election itself. According to Gould, four were agreed 
fairly easily.173 They were about limiting class sizes, cutting NHS waiting times, 
jobs for the young, and fast track punishment for some criminals. A fifth pledge 
was harder to agree as it was an attempt to deal with the last policy area that 
the modernisers thought was problematic - taxation. Shadow Chancellor 
Gordon Brown was toying with the idea of introducing a top level tax rate of 
50% but by January 1997 he had been persuaded to change his mind. He 
announced that neither the basic rate nor the top rate of tax would go up under 
Labour. Furthermore, a new Labour government would stick to Conservative 
Party spending plans for the first two years of the next parliament. The fifth 
pledge was now in place.  "No rise in income tax rates, cut VAT on heating to 
5% and inflation and interest rates as low as possible."174 Thomas describes the 
changes in tax policy as the most influential policy change in terms of media 
coverage.175 "The changing substance rather than the image offered the key to 
explaining Labour's press triumph in 1997."176 When the tax plans were 
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announced, Gould said it was an "amazing victory. Labour had done what five 
years before had seemed impossible: it had beaten the Tories on tax."177  
These policy changes left Labour open to the charge that it was a principle-free 
party searching for ideas - any ideas - that might make it popular. In addition, 
any policies adopted had to be popular with the press. To counter these 
arguments Blair made several attempts in numerous speeches to spell out the 
ideology of New Labour and these ideas were brought together in two books. 
The first came from Peter Mandelson in the Blair Revolution (1995) and a year 
later from Philip Gould in the Unfinished Revolution. There was a consistent 
framework to these new ideas. Blair, Mandelson and Gould all argued for a 
need to recast the old debates between right and left. Arguing that old choices 
such as nationalisation v privatisation or tax rises v tax cuts were no longer 
valid, it became known as "the third way." Barriers between old left and new 
right thinking were to be broken down with new partnerships between 
government and industry.178 Critics argued there was no substance to these 
ideas, that they were so broad and general they could mean anything to 
anyone. Initially, it appeared to be a commitment to developing a European-
style social democracy,179 others like Shaw were far more critical describing it 
as the abandonment of Keynesian social democracy.180 Indeed Shaw is 
persuasive when he says if there was an ideological framework it was support 
for the free market with the only justifiable public spending being in the areas of 
education, training and research and development which directly benefited the 
economy.181  
Mandelson said his attempt to formalise new Labour thinking was aimed at 
challenging opponents of the "third way" who saw it as value-free electoral 
expediency, examining the latest poll results and trying to come up with policies 
that would fit and appeal in particular to Middle England and the press.182 It was 
this notion of policy driven by opinion polls that the modernisers were eager to 
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defend themselves against. Blair, Mandelson, Campbell and Gould were all 
keen to point out the new policies had substance and were not just good 
presentation. Describing the 1997 campaign, Alistair Campbell said it was far 
more than a question of improved communications. "Much more important than 
what we said to the media was what we did, the overall vision put forward by 
Tony Blair and his colleagues."183 There certainly was a vision but details often 
remained vague. The economic journalist Will Hutton wrote the best selling 
book The State We're In (1996) shortly after Blair became Labour leader. He 
initially thought him to be the person who would return the party to centre-left 
social democracy.184 Blair often appropriated much of the language of Hutton's 
central theme in his book, that of the "stakeholder society."  This was a society 
where the economy would no longer be left solely to the free market. Capitalism 
would remain but there would be a range of stakeholders in the economy so it 
ran for the benefit of workers and customers as well as shareholders. This 
would limit the short-termism that Hutton argued afflicted much of the British 
economy. In Singapore in January 1996 Blair gave what Campbell then 
described as the party's keynote speech on the economy. "It is what I call a 
stakeholder economy," Blair told business leaders. "Opportunity is available to 
all, advancement is through merit and from which no group or class of people is 
excluded."185 The generality of much of the speech meant the Conservative's 
Michael Portillo was able to claim the Tories had already created the 
stakeholder society by privatising public utilities and creating several million 
more shareholders.186 With income tax levels unchanged and a commitment to 
Conservative spending plans, Hutton would later claim Labour was offering 
"very much the same economic framework as that established by the right over 
the past fifteen years."187 In 2007, he added: "It’s true that stakeholder 
capitalism is a philosophy still in search of a political home."188 
It is difficult to decide how much policy was influenced by this third way ideology 
and how much it was influenced by the media, partly because the two agendas 
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had much in common. Comments to the Leveson Inquiry suggested that the 
influence the right wing media had on policy was greater than acknowledged at 
the time. It certainly went beyond changes in tone that Campbell described to 
Leveson.189 Tone, for Campbell, would be something like Labour's law and 
order slogan: tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime. When dealing with 
papers such as the Daily Mail and The Sun, the emphasis from Labour would 
be 'tough on crime.' When dealing with papers such as The Guardian, the 
emphasis would be 'tough on the causes of crime.'  
Some of the evidence to Leveson suggests the press had a direct influence on 
policy. The statements from Andrew Neil and the former BBC political 
correspondent turned New Labour spin doctor Lance Price are insightful. Neil 
put it bluntly: "New Labour was prepared to pay a high price in terms of access 
and influence for the support of the Murdoch papers."190 Undoubtedly, how 
much influence Rupert Murdoch had on policy is complicated. News 
International - along with other companies - were bound to benefit from a 
Labour Party pursuing what was essentially a free market agenda. Benefits to 
proprietors like Murdoch, it could be argued, were simply the result of  
ideological compatibility. Price agreed there were no formal deals but  
"arrangements" with Murdoch which amounted to direct influence on policy. He 
told Leveson he had used the following phrase: "If Murdoch was left to pursue 
his business interests in peace he would give Labour a fair wind." This was a 
close approximation of the words used by several sources who attended the 
News Corporation event in Australia in 1995, which Tony Blair attended.191 He 
added: "I think it is significant that in my three years working for the Blair 
government I can recall no conversation that contradicted the impression that 
an arrangement had been made."192 He describes Murdoch as the "24th 
member of the cabinet" and no big decision was taken in Number 10 without 
taking into account the likely reaction of three men: Gordon Brown, John 
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Prescott and Rupert Murdoch.193 Andrew Neil describes the tight links between 
the upper echelons of the Murdoch empire and the Labour government as "a 
vortex of relationships."194 It was, according to Neil, unprecedented in the 
history of the press and took place largely behind closed doors and unrecorded 
in official minutes. He says Blair told him in 1996: "How we treat Rupert 
Murdoch's media interests when in power will depend on how his newspapers 
treated the Labour Party in the run up to the election."195 
Murdoch denies any deals with Prime Ministers past or present or any attempts 
to directly influence policy.196 He told Leveson meetings were part of his work 
as a publisher to understand policy and to best serve his readers. Tony Blair 
was an impressive figure and a personal friend.  He never requested the 
support of News International but "he was a politician and I had no doubt that 
he would welcome the support of our newspapers."197 He points out some of the 
critical coverage his papers gave Labour - once asking whether Blair was  
the most dangerous man in Britain. There were also Labour policies which 
adversely affected his business, such as an increased licence fee for the BBC 
and the establishment of the regulator Ofcom.   
Tony Blair articulated similar arguments to Leveson. However, he was much 
more open and said that writing in 2012 meant he could comment with "greater 
frankness."198 So it proved, despite beginning his statement cautiously. He 
reiterated his hostility to the press and remained convinced of its ability to 
influence elections. He argued the press remained important because of their 
deep penetration into British society and they still had a huge influence on 
setting the news agenda of broadcasters. He also said many of the British 
papers adopted an aggressive style and were used as political tools by their 
owners whereby the lines between political comment and news were blurred. 
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"The consequence," he told the Inquiry, "is that any politician who falls out with 
a section of that media…has a serious and potentially politically life-threatening 
problem."199 Nevertheless, Blair accepted he had a close interaction with 
proprietors but that interaction was inevitable and necessary. He also 
highlighted a number of areas where government policy worked against the 
interests of Murdoch's broadcasting interests. These included: preventing the 
takeover of Manchester United by BSkyB; granting new channels to the BBC; 
and giving the BBC an increased licence fee. 
Blair's frankness to Leveson is revealing. For a man who chooses his words 
very carefully, this sentence is extraordinary: "As far as the formulation of policy, 
we tried very hard (my emphasis) to keep the line between persuading the 
media of a policy and allowing them privileged access in formulating it."200 He 
went on to say there was nothing wrong with briefing the media or interacting 
with them to understand their readers. "This could influence policy but I don't 
think that was unhealthy."201 This is an acknowledgement that a proprietor could 
influence policy on the pretext that the proprietor was representing the views of 
his readers. This is flawed on two levels. It treats the millions of readers as one 
homogenous block, either in favour or against any particular issue. It is also an 
attempt to represent the political views of readers whose views in themselves - 
if they exist at all - have been influenced by the proprietor. Blair went on to say 
that it could be very hard to adopt a policy when it was likely to be the subject of 
a media campaign against it. He highlighted the issue of media ownership as an 
example of this. Between 1994-1997 the party changed its policy on media 
ownership and Blair says this decision was taken for ideological reasons 
(foreign ownership should not be regarded differently to British ownership) but 
also because "it would be fair to say that had we kept that policy, it would have 
been a problem with the Murdoch press."202 
Andrew Neil argues that Labour in power did nothing to undermine or threaten 
Murdoch’s British media interests, despite a deep desire among many in the 
Labour party, especially (but not exclusively) on the left, to "cut him down to 
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size."203 Neil went on to say demands for a privacy law were put on hold and 
Murdoch's control of 37% of national newspaper circulation was tolerated. He 
added: "BSkyB was allowed to grow unhindered and light-touch media 
regulation became the consensus of the day."204 He then went on to say that 
Labour paved the way for Murdoch's News Corporation to attempt to buy the 
60% of BSkyB that it did not own with the 2003 Communications Act.  
 
This was something Mr Murdoch’s people lobbied hard for, with 
his support, and they had unique and extensive access to the 
levers of power at the heart of the Blair government to make 
this lobbying effective. When Mr Murdoch testified before this 
Inquiry that he had never asked government for anything it gave 
me cause to wonder if he had forgotten this - or forgotten he 
was testifying under oath.205 
 
Commenting on media ownership in particular Price added: "As a journalist pre-
1997 I was, however, aware that all discussion on limiting cross-media 
ownership ceased within Labour Party policy circles and that those who  
supported restrictions believed that this was a direct consequence of the party 
leadership courting Murdoch."206   
 
Labour's former Director of Communications Peter Mandelson was also 
remarkably open about the influence of the media and its owners. Both he and 
Tony Blair were worried about the political implications of Gordon Brown's idea 
of introducing a new 50p tax rate for those earning more than £100,000 a year. 
At the Murdoch conference in Australia in 1995, Blair had been pinned against 
an aircraft door and given the following advice by Australia's Labor Prime 
Minister Paul Keating: "Under no circumstances ever go into an election saying 
you will put up income taxes."207  Brown's idea never saw the light of day. 
                                            
203
 Neil, statement to the Leveson Inquiry, 9
th
 July 2012.  
204
 Ibid. 
205
 Ibid. 
206
 Price, statement to the Leveson Inquiry, 9
th
 July 2012. 
207
 Mandelson, The Third Man, p. 201. 
 
  
 71    
 
In answering questions from Leveson, Mandelson discussed media influence on 
policy. In a carefully worded, yet frank statement Mandelson said:  
The media's influence exists but it is not the major factor (my 
italics) in deciding the party's policies. If there is an influence, 
the media would argue it is an extension of the public's views 
and interests (rather than the public's views being shaped by 
the media.) The media certainly have an ability in the way they 
present a party's policies to shape how these policies are 
received and seen and that has a bearing on party leaders."208 
Mandelson highlighted Europe as a key area where Murdoch may seek to 
influence policy and potentially clash with the pro-European Tony Blair. 
Mandelson had deep reservations about the change in tone on Europe, law and 
order and immigration to ensure the Murdoch press stayed on board. He also 
suggested it was one factor Blair considered in replacing Robin Cook with the 
Eurosceptic Jack Straw after the 2001 general election.209 He went on to say 
there was direct influence from Murdoch on European policy. Prior to the 1997 
general election Blair wrote an article in The Sun professing his devotion to the 
pound sterling at a time when party policy was to hold a referendum on joining 
the single currency. "It is said that at this point Rupert Murdoch finally made up 
his mind to back New Labour," said Mandelson. "In my view, he would have 
reached that decision in any case and that the concession on the currency was 
not necessary."210 Mandelson also suggested that the decision not to call a 
referendum on the Euro in 1998 was partly due to the opposition it would attract 
from the Murdoch press. Mandelson's startling summary was: "It is improbable 
that the government would have made any important move on Europe without 
at least warning News International beforehand."211 Other commentators agreed 
with this analysis. Andrew Neil told Leveson that Europe threatened to upset the 
cosy "Blair-Murdoch love-in" and that the proprietor had "a major influence on 
government policy."212 Further evidence about Murdoch's influence on 
                                            
208
 Mandelson, statement to the Leveson Inquiry, 21
st
 May 2012. 
209
 Ibid.  
210
 Ibid. 
211
 Ibid. 
212
 Neil, statement to the Leveson Inquiry, 9
th
 July 2012.  
 
  
 72    
 
European policy came from Labour's former deputy leader Roy Hattersley. He 
told presenter Anthony Howard on the BBC Radio programme Power and the 
Press that The Sun's support had come at a price. Blair could have been far 
more positive about joining the European single currency if he'd not been so 
fearful of the reaction from Murdoch.213  
Price supports much of what Mandelson told Leveson on Europe. In his own 
statement to Leveson, Price describes taking part in policy discussions with 
ministers and the likely reaction of the press - particularly News International - 
was usually a key feature of those discussions. He said a person "close to Tony 
Blair's thinking" had told him that "we've promised News International we won't 
make changes to our Europe policy without talking to them."214 Responding to 
the issue of Europe in his Leveson statement, Blair accepts Murdoch had strong 
views on the issue "as did a raft of other dominant media figures. Most of all so 
did the public."215 He explicitly denies Mandelson's claim that Murdoch 
prevented him from advocating Britain join the Euro. He says those decisions 
were political. Ideologically he wanted to join the Euro but he was persuaded 
otherwise because the economic circumstances were not right.  
It is undeniable that Labour's media methods for the 1997 election were 
successful in many ways. Although largely based on the methods that were 
used in 1992 and 1987, they were ruthlessly deployed with Peter Mandelson 
back at the helm.  In addition, they had been updated and refined. Not only did 
these tactics help set the agenda they played a much more crucial part in 
neutralising press hostility. The rapid rebuttal system got a £500,000 
investment.  Essentially, it was a computer system named Excalibur with a huge 
capacity to read and store material. Its purpose was to very quickly challenge 
any statements from the Conservatives to ensure the story became about 
Labour's response and not the original accusation. This was especially 
important for TV and the 24 hour news channel Sky News where the need for "a 
new line" on the story was a constant demand put upon journalists. Journalists 
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want to keep their story updated to make them look on top of developments in 
news. If these stories are now being broadcast on the hour, there are greater 
opportunities for spin doctors to influence the general thrust of a story.   
Thomas highlights the effectiveness of the strategy on the issue of tax.216  In 
November 1996, the Conservatives released a dossier suggesting Labour's 
spending commitments would mean tax rises of £1,200 for every family in the 
country.  The figures, according to the press, had been approved by the head of 
the civil service. Even before the Tories had officially made their claims, Gordon 
Brown had already gone on the offensive, accusing the Tories of lying. The 
party press team had established that the figures had not been approved and, 
indeed, there was criticism that the civil service had been asked to check the 
statistics. Shortly after, there was an in depth rebuttal distributed to all 
journalists accusing the Tories of a further 89 lies.   
Agenda setting as defined earlier continued apace but it was one of several 
tactics that began to get out of control and damage the party. By 1997, many 
broadcast journalists were wise to these techniques, although it appeared to 
have little effect on coverage and did not hamper Labour's control over TV 
pictures. There was also growing criticism of the role of spin doctors, who were 
becoming much more aggressive in their treatment of journalists. The 
Guardian's Westminster correspondent David Hencke said journalists would be 
fed stories which had to be reported in a certain way. "Follow something 
different and the journalist, editor or TV executive will know all about it the next 
day," he said.217 Gould remained dismissive saying any criticism of "spin 
doctors" was ill-founded,218 it was merely an American name given to straight-
down-the-line spokespeople for the party. MPs were also growing increasingly 
concerned, Clare Short referred to Mandelson and Campbell as "Blair's dark 
men." She told The Guardian: "I think the obsession with the media and focus 
groups is making us look like we want power at any price."219  
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Both Blair and Alistair Campbell thought the British press was different to any 
other in the world because of its influence on the broadcast media. They 
believed it worked in the following way. The technical and logistical process of 
gathering TV news is time consuming. That's why agenda setting is possible - 
providing filming opportunities and case studies is very appealing to hard 
pressed TV journalists with deadlines to meet. For the same reasons, TV 
journalists will examine the morning papers for stories that can be quickly 
followed up. Campbell describes this as the right wing "prism" through which 
broadcasters viewed the news.220 As a TV journalist, I would often justify the 
need for TV coverage because a story "was all over the papers." To try to 
combat this, the Labour press team developed two tactics. The first was 
"trailing" key speeches in the morning's papers. If an important policy 
announcement was due from Labour one morning, it would be battling for the 
broadcasters' attention with whatever else was in the papers. The battle is 
easier if one of the stories in the papers IS the speech that is about to be 
delivered. So, even though the full speech is yet to be delivered, a few titbits 
can be leaked to the press the night before and appear in the papers on the day 
of the speech. It is a media management master stroke. The papers will go for it 
because it's an "exclusive" foretaste of what's to come. The broadcasters would 
often complain but were not put off because the story was now on the agenda; 
the logistics meant it was difficult to change at such short notice; and although 
the story had been published in a newspaper it was still new in broadcast terms.  
Campbell describes one story illustrating two of the tactics employed by 
Labour.221 One was trailing, the other was what some would call blackmail, 
some might call a "deal." On January 8th 1996, Blair was to give an important 
speech on the economy to a small gathering of business leaders in Singapore. 
He was being accompanied by one TV journalist, Jon Sopel from the BBC.  
However, to make sure the story featured in the morning papers, Campbell 
tipped off journalists working for The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph the 
evening before, providing them with enough quotes to be able to run the story. It 
duly appeared that morning under the headline "Blair unveils big economic 
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idea."222 Sopel was still keen to run the story for BBC TV news but for it to work 
he needed to film Blair giving the speech. Campbell assured him it could be 
arranged but with one proviso. Sopel had to give an undertaking there would be 
no wide shots used in the piece revealing the small scale nature of the 
gathering. Campbell was so obsessed with detail he did not want to create the 
impression that Blair was speaking to a small, insignificant number of people. It 
would make the Labour leader look small and insignificant. The piece ran on the 
6 O'clock News with the arrangement in place. In order to edit different parts of 
the speech together journalists use what are called "cutaways," because a shot 
is used to cut away from the speaker. At a speech or press conference these 
are usually shots of the audience or the assembled media. A very wide shot 
here gives an impression of the size of the event. In this story, the cutaways 
were tight shots of individuals, giving no sense of scale.223 
As a political messenger, Tony Blair broke new ground. He was young, good 
looking, with the skill set required to communicate via the media. This involved 
looking and speaking in a confident, genuine and open way. It involved the 
ability to summarise often complex political arguments, making them relevant to 
people and also delivering them in a 20 second soundbite for television. Gould 
identified a natural oratorical flair as early as 1990.224 The skills he used in 
dealing with the media were also deployed in delivering longer, often more 
complex speeches. He benefitted greatly from the circumstances of the time. 
Dealing with the media had always been an issue for Prime Ministers but from 
the 1980s the growing political communications industry meant there was a 
huge amount of advice on offer. Closely tied to the growing importance of 
television, there was readily available advice on a whole range of issues from 
appearance to interview techniques. These opportunities were seized by Blair 
who was a willing participant and a firm believer in the importance of the media 
to influence politics. I interviewed Blair for The Observer newspaper when he 
was shadow Home Secretary in 1992. His media skills were apparent then. 
Questions were answered in a short simple fashion. He spoke clearly and 
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paused as he watched my faltering shorthand take it down. He would repeat the 
main message he wanted to get across. He was instantly likeable.  
Blair had a strong link to national newspapers and how they ran, that link was 
Alistair Campbell. A national newspaper journalist for many years, he had 
contacts across the media. He also had unprecedented authority to speak for 
Blair in off the record briefings and even to write for Blair in the many 
newspaper articles that appeared under the leader's name. Campbell was also 
on hand to advise Blair on how to deal with a potentially hostile media. He has 
always denied policy was influenced by the media but he was more than willing 
to change the tone of an article to suit a particular paper. This was meeting a 
newspaper's interests with rhetoric, as he told the Leveson Inquiry.225 Blair's 
skill as a messenger was also helped by personal characteristics. Newspaper 
editors actually liked him, boosted by the fact that many did not like John Major. 
As stated earlier by Thomas, the "snob mob"226 liked the Oxford-educated Blair. 
As one editor put it: "I find Blair so much easier to get along with than Major. I 
suppose it's a class thing. He's so much more like us, isn't he?"227 
There is little doubt that the media strategy of the 1997 campaign was hugely 
successful. It is permanently woven into the narrative of why Labour won in 
1997 and formed the basis of two general election victories to follow. The four 
pillars of the framework came together to produce one highly effective 
campaign. The messenger was media savvy and highly skilled in the use of 
television. This was in stark contrast to the man he was trying to replace. The 
message had been changed beyond recognition so it was acceptable to a 
mainly right wing press. That resulted in a transformation of the media context 
with a majority of newspapers supporting, if not Labour, then certainly Tony 
Blair. The methods employed to convey the message were modern, well 
organised and well-funded. They were deployed ruthlessly. This strategy has 
been held up as a template and other parties have followed, such as the David 
Cameron-led Conservative Party at the 2010 election.228 Yet, there are many 
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critics who say it came at too high a price. Policy changes robbed the Labour 
Party of its soul, with much of its traditional support left behind. The slick, 
soundbite style of presentation lacked substance and created politicians who 
looked and sounded the same. The new ways of managing the media created 
resentment amongst journalists and ultimately created the impression of a 
government obsessed with spin. The change in the media context would be 
short term because the media hadn't changed, Labour had. My conclusion will 
examine the value of my framework in analysing media strategy. I will then 
question whether the changes which were implemented were necessary and 
finally ask if the power of the media was exaggerated leading to an undue 
influence on policy. 
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Conclusion 
The Labour Party's media strategy from 1983 to 1997 was central to the 
development of the whole party during this period and to the New Labour 
project. The changes amounted to a transformation in political communications, 
as Ralph Negrine identified. 229 My conclusion will look at each of the factors in 
the framework and summarise the developments during the fourteen year 
period. I will also evaluate the usefulness of the framework itself. Then I will 
focus on the key changes and suggest how my work has contributed to the 
debate in this area of study.   
The framework provided structure to the dissertation. Each factor was broad 
enough to include a number of elements that helped bring coherence to the 
discussion. It was a manageable framework for a work of this length. The 
messenger referred not just to the party leader but also to other members of the 
party who were given leading roles in general election campaigns, particularly in 
1992. The methods brought together organisational and structural changes but 
also the vital tactical changes which  were to serve Labour so well for most of 
this period. The factor termed message was the most interesting area as it dealt 
with the policies the party wanted to communicate through the media and these 
changed dramatically. I tried to avoid detailed reference to party political 
broadcasts but they were relevant in a couple of instances. Finally, the media 
context was a vital factor in the framework but perhaps the most limiting. Labour 
had to understand the context of the media: who they were supporting, how 
they operated and which media had the most influence.  The media context was 
used as an indication of the political context of a given period which, in 
hindsight, was useful but too general. For example, the tabloids' devotion to 
Margaret Thatcher reflected an element of the electorate but did not fully reflect 
the divisive nature of her tenure. Perhaps there should have been another 
factor entitled political context.  
Each of the four factors changed substantially during the period in question. The 
requirements demanded of the messenger developed to such an extent that 
acquiring the skills for dealing with the media became a pre-requisite for being 
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leader. Michael Foot was extremely limited in this area, especially when it came 
to television. The communication skills he had - speaking in parliament or to 
large crowds - were becoming less relevant. By his own admission he was 
unwilling to learn the skills required for the TV age. Defeat in 1983 highlighted 
the need to improve the media skills of the party leader and Neil Kinnock proved 
himself to be a capable messenger. At the 1987 general election he was seen 
by the party's media advisors as a vote winner against an increasingly divisive 
Margaret Thatcher. His personal appeal was captured in the party election 
broadcast that became known as Kinnock: The Movie. The tabloids were not 
persuaded and the abuse Kinnock suffered at the hands of the press was 
unprecedented and greatly affected the strategists thinking about the leadership 
role. It was felt that Kinnock had earned the right to lead the party into the next 
general election but his media performances had been mixed. In 1992, a new 
strategy was adopted. There was more of a team approach using some of the 
more telegenic members of the shadow cabinet, including Tony Blair. Some of 
those close to Kinnock, such as Charles Clarke, deliberately kept him away 
from the spotlight to try and minimise the vitriol from the media. As Berry states, 
this was probably an error, given that Kinnock in full flow could have made 
political headway against the relatively inexperienced John Major.230 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what more could have been done to avoid the 
mauling Kinnock received in the press at the 1992 general election. Charles 
Clarke's meetings with News International were doomed to failure.  There were 
some signs of change - the Financial Times backed Labour and the tabloids 
were a little less aggressive - but he remained personally unpopular in Fleet 
Street. As Andrew Neil suggests, if there was one general election where the 
media influenced the final result, this was it.231 After the death of John Smith, 
Labour's new leadership took no chances. Tony Blair was elected partly 
because of his skills as a TV communicator and he also possessed the kind of 
privileged background that would appeal to most Fleet Street editors. He was 
young, dynamic and articulate. The ultimate political communicator for the new 
millennium had been found.  On the positive side, this helped to create a party 
                                            
230
  Berry, in Parliamentary Affairs, pp. 565-581. 
231
  Neil, statement to the Leveson Inquiry, July 9
th
 2012.   
 
 
  
 80    
 
leader who appeared competent, professional and was able to articulate a 
political message. But there were also negative outcomes. The criticisms that 
were levelled at Blair remain today - leaders are too slick, they look and sound 
the same, they never answer the question. In the television age, the focus of 
politics moved to personalities rather than policy. The success of Donald Trump 
and Jeremy Corbyn is part of the backlash against the growth of this 
monochrome, media-savvy politician.  
By 1997, the modern template for the methods of dealing with the press was in 
place. Rising from the ashes of the shambolic 1983 campaign, the press 
operation was re-organised under the control of Peter Mandelson, notably a 
former television producer. The Shadow Communications Agency was formed 
to bring together all press strategy, plus information from a variety of polling and 
market research organisations. For the 1987 general election Mandelson and 
Patricia Hewitt brought a planning and organisational zeal to Labour's 
communications and the emphasis was on the importance of television news. 
The tactic of agenda setting to influence TV news was successfully deployed 
and would remain a staple of the strategies that followed in 1992 and 1997. 
Mandelson and Hewitt were not involved in the '92 campaign and it is no 
coincidence there were several mistakes, such as the Sheffield rally and the 
focus on PR in the final week. Mandelson was back for 1997 and the latest 
methods for dealing with the press were ruthlessly deployed. The focus 
remained on TV and the planning "grid" was deployed to try and set the 
agenda. Half a million pounds was spent on "Excalibur" the latest technology to 
help rebut Tory claims about Labour. This rapid rebuttal was supplemented by a 
new and aggressive treatment of journalists who were challenged on their 
stories and harassed by Labour's press team, eager to put their side of the 
story. 
Some of these developments were groundbreaking in British politics. There is 
no doubting the benefits of Labour's re-organisation and the professionalisation 
of its media operations. Agenda setting and rapid rebuttal remain standard 
practice in modern political campaigning, although there is some evidence that 
journalists were resenting stories and pictures being organised for them. For the 
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most part, they continued to follow the agenda being set by the Party but they 
were now more willing to challenge the stories they were being fed. The 
shambles surrounding the "Jennifer's Ear" party political broadcast in 1992 is 
testament to that. Challenging journalists also remains a legitimate weapon in 
the press officer's armoury but again some aspects were already out of control 
by 1997, causing damage in the media. As David Hencke of The Guardian 
wrote, journalists who crossed the spin doctors found themselves out of favour, 
with no exclusives or leaked reports.232 
A growing number of MPs were disgruntled by the autonomy of the SCA which 
had such great influence over the Party's message. The use of focus groups 
and polling research which drove the message was also being challenged.  
Clare Short's comments in the previous chapter were not isolated and Shaw's 
arguments on the subject are convincing.233 Much of the focus group data was 
presented without question. The perceptions that voters had of the party were 
accepted not as perceptions but as the truth. The leadership believed most of 
the media was biased and yet the voters' opinions that were shaped by that 
bias were readily accepted. 
On the surface, the media context changed dramatically. One daily newspaper 
backed Labour in 1983, by 1997 the majority of the press backed Labour for the 
first time in its history. This was the result of a well planned and exhaustive 
attempt to bring on board media owners. It was one of the main goals of the 
new leadership and the reason why Alistair Campbell was granted such 
widespread authority to speak for Tony Blair. The chief focus was on News 
International for two key reasons. The Sun was the most popular daily 
newspaper in the country and was read by swing voters who were crucial to 
election victories. Secondly, it was apparent that News International was open 
to persuasion in a way that papers such as the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph  
were not. Endorsement by The Sun in 1997 was a significant achievement but it 
was support for Blair personally and the policies which had moved decisively 
towards the paper's way of thinking. When Blair stood down, support for Labour 
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began to melt away. There is little doubt the media was important for Labour but 
its significance has been exaggerated. Tony Blair admitted as much in his 
Radio 4 interview with Peter Hennessy when he said Labour had played into the 
media's hands.234 It is easy to understand how this happened. Blair, Mandelson, 
Gould and Campbell had all seen Labour slaughtered in the media and equated 
it with election defeat. This was especially true after the loss in 1992 and they 
swore it would never happen again. The leadership knew the tabloids were a 
declining force but remained convinced they set the TV agenda. Although this 
had an element of truth, the Party failed to understand the extent to which 
newspaper proprietors such as Rupert Murdoch were ready to accommodate 
Labour. As Bingham and Conboy point out, the realignment was not as deep 
rooted as it first appeared.235 It was clear in 1997 backing was for Blair, rather 
than Labour. Newspaper support increased at the 2001 general election but it 
gradually fell away. By 2009 with Gordon Brown as Labour leader The Sun 
switched back to supporting the Tories.  
The other part of the media context that Labour grasped after 1983 was the 
importance of television. It was a difficult balancing act as TV gradually grew in 
importance but newspapers remained influential in setting the agenda. Shaw's 
arguments that Labour relied too much on television are persuasive, particularly 
for 1987 and 1992. He says the nature of TV news journalism and impartiality 
renders it a difficult medium in which to advocate complex arguments for 
change, such as on the economy. When Labour's aim was to run the economy 
differently this caused difficulties in getting the message across. Impartiality was 
also questionable, according to Shaw, as many experts used in TV analysis 
were drawn from the conservative professions of industry and finance. Of 
course, by 1997 this was much less of an issue when Labour was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the free market and industry and finance experts were 
less likely to be critical.  
The difference in the message from 1983 to 1997 was vast. Re-nationalisation, 
unilateralism, departure from the common market and tax rises to fund 
investment had all been ditched. They were replaced by a commitment to a free 
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market economy within Europe and a specific promise to stick to Conservative 
spending plans. There were a number of factors that led to this transformation. 
The Party had lost and lost badly in 1983 so leadership and policy were bound 
to change. The defeat was so clearly tied to the left that a rightwards shift was 
inevitable. The message was changed because it was deemed to be unpopular 
with voters and ideologically at odds with the new leadership. The importance of 
the media in delivering this message was recognised but the emphasis was on 
an efficient and well organised approach to media relations rather than the 
content of the message. When that failed again in 1987 the focus of the media 
strategy was on the message. There remained an ideological and political 
underpinning for moving policy further to the right, although it was becoming 
harder for Labour MPs to swallow and some policies, such as the abandonment 
of unilateralism, were personally difficult for Kinnock himself. How the message 
would play out in the media was becoming increasingly important but this still 
failed to prevent policy being savaged again at the '92 election. The direction 
the message would take after this defeat became uncertain. Too centrist or not 
centrist enough?  The leadership would decide and under John Smith it looked 
likely the rightward shift would stop. However, his sudden death saw a dramatic 
change. The Blair leadership was ideologically and politically committed to 
further policy transformation and by 1997 what the media thought of these 
policies was considered to be vitally important.  
The changes to Labour Party policy are the most controversial aspects of this 
period. It is difficult to say just how far policy had to move to the centre ground 
to gain media support but this is not the central element of this thesis. What is 
more relevant is the claim by modernisers that policy was being driven by the 
demands of the electorate and not the demands of the media. There is now 
more evidence to suggest the media had a greater influence on policy than is 
widely accepted. Bingham and Conboy say Labour "frequently deferred to it 
(press power) rather than challenge it"236 but I would go further. Key figures in 
New Labour accept that Rupert Murdoch directly influenced policy as revealed 
in the statements to Leveson. Some of the comments are general. Blair says he 
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"tried very hard" 237 to keep the press from influencing policy, which implies 
sometimes he failed. Mandelson says press influence was not the main factor in 
policy making, which implies it was a minor factor.238 Other comments are more 
specific and placed alongside statements from Lance Price and Andrew Neil a 
convincing narrative emerges. Blair accepts party policy on media ownership 
was changed between 1994 and 1997 and acknowledges that if it had not been 
changed it would have been a problem with the Murdoch press.239 Mandelson 
says Blair's anti-European articles in The Sun prior to the 1997 election amount 
to a policy concession with the referendum on joining the Euro eventually being 
dropped.240 This influence began after Tony Blair's election as leader and was 
part of the obsession with the power of the press. When the political editor of 
The Sun Trevor Kavanagh said it was Labour which had changed, not his 
paper, he was being disingenuous. 241 His paper was one of the chief architects 
of that change. It is clear this was not simply a change of tone described by 
Campbell, nor an ideological and political response to general election 
defeats.242 
The overriding theme to Labour's relations with the media between 1983 and 
1997 is the growing importance the party placed on the media. In 1983, it was a 
secondary issue with very little in the way of organisation, planning, tactics or 
consideration of what the press would make of the manifesto. Some left wing 
party members did not care, others thought it unimportant. By 1997, this 
situation had been turned on its head. The media strategy was highly 
organised, tightly controlled and what the media made of party policy was 
considered vital to success. Overall, the changes appear to have worked very 
well. An efficient, well organised and executed media strategy played an 
important role in three election victories. But there were costs. The media 
became highly critical of the tactics, as did many party members and voters. 
More fundamentally, the policy changes driven by the media profoundly altered 
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the party and the process robbed the party of its soul. If Gould says Labour 
under Kinnock did not change far enough fast enough perhaps under Blair it 
changed too far and too fast.  
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